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PREFACE 
It is generally assumed that opposition to the German remilitari-
zation of the Rhineland in 1936 probably could have prevented World War 
II. Through an examination of the diplomatic documents published by the 
French government and the recollections of those who participated in the 
decisions that were made, this study attempts to determine why France 
failed to act. 
I acknowledge the attention of the members of my committee, Dr. 
Douglas Hale, Dr. George Jewsbury, and Dr. John Sylvester. To the en-
tire faculty of the Department of History at Oklahoma State University, 
I must express my deepest appreciation for the fairness, kindness, and 
confidence which I have recently been given. 
I am obligated to Dr. William Rock, of the Department of History at 
Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, for his suggestion 
of the topic and his guidance in the initial preparation of my work. 
I am also indebted to the staff of the Oklahoma State University 
Library for their assistance in obtaining many sources. 
I am very grateful to my typist, Mrs. Dixie Jennings, for the 
sympathy which she has shown me, as well as for her fine work. 
The unceasing reassurance and support given me by my parents has 
been the primary factor in my ability to continue working against con-
stant discouragement. For this and my other academic achievements, I 
must give them the credit. 
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CHAPTER I 
FRANCE AT THE FRONTIER OF FREEDOM 
On March 7, 1936, German troops entered the demilitarized zone of 
the Rhineland, violating the Treaty of Versailles as well as the Treaty 
of Locarno, which Germany had freely accepted in 1925. 1 At the end of 
World War I, France had insisted upon the demilitarization of Germany's 
western border in order to prevent a sudden devastating attack and to 
allow France to attack swiftly into the industrial heart of Germany if 
Poland or Czechoslovakia were threatened. Yet, when challenged in the 
Rhineland, France failed to act in what was probably its best opportu-
nity to check Adolf Hitler's aggression without war. A firm response 
from France in 1936 might have removed Hitler from power and averted 
World War II ~- or at least would have made the war easier when it came, 
For the French, the most crucial period was the first few days immedi-
ately following the entry of German troops into the Rhineland, and it 
is the activities of the French government during these critical hours 
which will be explored. The Rhineland crisis provides a useful study 
of the decision-making process in a government faced with a coup and 
indicates the general pattern of appeasement that Britain and France 
would take toward Nazi aggression, 
1The Rhineland is a rather imprecise term applied to the Rhine 
Valley. It generally refers to the Prussian province of Rheinland and 
those portions of Hesse-Nassau, Hesse, Baden, and the Bavarian 
Palatinate lying within the valley. 
1 
2 
The most important question that can be asked is why those men in 
France who could have decided to act against Germany failed. In at-
tempting an answer, it will be necessary to develop the diplomatic back-
ground and then present an account of the actions of the French govern-
ment. Fortunately, many of the participants wrote memoirs which elo-
quently relate the concerns of each and present his version of the 
events. Although their writings could be considered exercises in 
placing the blame elsewhere, it is possible to develop a fairly lucid 
narrative from their recollections. General Maurice Gamelin, the Chief 
of the Army General Staff, kept a daily journal and wrote the most com-
2 plete account. The memoirs of Pierre-Etienne Flandin, the Foreign 
Minister, tend to be more emotional and slightly less reliable, and his 
d . d "b f . 3 ten ency to omit ates contri utes to some con usion. Joseph Paul-
I 
Boncour, the Minister of the League .of Nations, wrote an account which 
dealt very explicitly with the meetings of the Council of Ministers in 
Paris, but he was unaccountably reticent about the League meetings. 4 
Andre Franrois~Poncet, the French ambassador in Berlin, left a thoughtc 
ful memoir which is remarkably free of faultfinding. 5 In regard to 
documentary sources, the French government has published Documents 
2General Maurice Gamelin, Servir, vol. II, Le prologue du drame, 
1930-aout 1939 (Paris, 1946). 
3Pierre-Etienne Flandin, Politique francaise, 1919-1940 (Paris, 
194 7) . 
4 Joseph Paul-Boncour, Entre ~ guerres (New York, 1946). 
5Andre Franrois-Poncet, The Faithful Years: Memoirs of a French 
Ambassador in Berlin, 1931-1938 (New York, 1949). 
3 
Diplomatiques Frantais. 6 Regrettably, the documents for 1935 have not 
yet been published. 
For the French, the problem of the Rhine as a frontier was at 
least two thousand years old. Roman legions established the Rhine as 
their border with the Germans, and with the end of the Pax Romana, there 
came three centuries of invasions across the Rhine. The history of the 
Rhine Valley as a formal buffer zone between the regions that became 
modern France and Germany began in 843 with the Treaty of Verdun, which 
divided Charlemagne's Empire among his grandsons. The unfortunate 
Lothar, who received the middle kingdom which ran along the Rhine, was 
the victim of continual war between his brothers. The Thirty Years' 
War brought indescribable destruction which was repeated when Louis XIV 
devastated the Palatinate in 1688, 
Although German in race and language, Rhinelanders developed a 
feeling of being different from their Prussian neighbors who provided 
the impetus for the formation of modern Germany. Rhinelanders have 
sometimes exhibited a capricious nature which favored first the French 
and then the Germans. For example, they welcomed the armies of revolu-
tionary France and then turned to Prussia when it became evident that 
France intended annexation. In fact, it was during the French Revolu-
tion that the concept of natural frontiers was first realized for 
France. Georges Danton, a leader of the Jacobins, formulated the doc-
trine quite concisely: "The limits of France are marked by nature. We 
shall reach them in the four corners of the horizon, to the Ocean, to 
6oocuments Diplomatiques Francais, 1932-1939, 2nd Series, 1936-
1939 (Paris, 1963), (hereafter cited as DDF). 
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7 the Rhine, to the Alps, to the Pyrenees." Hence, the tradition of 
French concern for a natural frontier on the Rhine was conceived during 
the .Revolution and realized by Napoleon. 
In 1815, the Congress of Vienna, which attempted to restore the 
balance that Napoleon had destroyed, gave most of the Rhineland to 
Prussia and Bavaria. After the Congress of Vienna, both France and 
Prussia appeared to accept the status quo, but French fears for their 
security were proved correct when Germany was able to deliver a crushing 
blow through the Rhineland in 1870. Then Germany completed its victory 
by annexing Alsace-Lorraine. Consequently, from 1870 to 1918, France's 
position on the Rhine was exactly what it feared most. The military 
advantage which Germany held on the left bank of the Rhine seemed almost 
insurmountable. 8 
Again in 1914, Germany was able to advance rapidly into Flanders 
and northern France due to the advantage of controlling the bridgeheads 
of the Rhine. World War I was the greatest test and the greatest vie-
tory of the .Third French Republic, which had been born in the defeat of 
1870, but the price of victory was indeed high. France had lost one 
hundred thirty-four billion francs in goods and property and, more im-
portant, one and one-half million Frenchmen had been killed. One out 
of ten Frenchmen h~d been killed at the front, and the youth had been 
decimated most. Population losses during the war further lowered the 
French birthrate, which had already been declining for several years. 
When World War II started in 1939, France had less than half as many 
7Georges Danton, Les plus beaux discours .de Danton, ed. by Paul 
Lorquet (Paris, n.d.), p. 52. 
8 Goronwy Rees,~ Rhine (New York, 1967), pp. 158-167. 
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men as Germany between the ages of twenty and thirty-four. The cele-
bration of victory.in 1918 was necessarily short lived, for Frenchmen 
sensed that they could not stand against the greater population and 
superior industrial base of even a defeated Germany without the help of 
the United States and Britain. 9 
Thus the Rhineland, through which Germany had launched invasions 
in 1814, 1815, 1870, and 1914, was logically the first French concern 
in establishing security after the war. Although the French Parliament 
remained mostly silent on the Rhineland issue during World War I, a 
great many private citizens had advanced various theories concerning 
France's role in the Rhineland and its implications for the future. 
Their main theme was that the Rhinelanders.were Gallo-Roman, not truly 
German in origin, and that they would recognize the advantages of being 
associated with France when the war was over. 10 The plans of the French 
government were formulated in two documents written early in 1917. In 
January, French Premier Aristide Briand advised his ambassador in London 
that France must have the primary voice in determining the settlement 
of the Rhineland, since France was the most concerned. Furthermore, a 
secret Franco-Russian Agreement in February provided that the left bank 
of the Rhine should be ceded by Germany to constitute a neutral state 
which would be occupied by France until the terms of the peace settle-
ment had been carried out. 11 Nevertheless, these designs remained to 
9William L. Shirer, The Collapse£!.~ Third Republic: An Inquiry 
.!..!!!£ the £!1.!. of France ~ .!2.iQ. (New York, 1969), pp. 142-143. 
10Jere C. King, Foch versus Clemenceau, 1918-1919 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1960), pp. 2-11. 
11w. M. Jordan, Great Britain, France, and the German Problem, 
---------1918-1939 (London, 1943), pp. 171-172. 
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be implemented in the face of considerable reluctance on the part of 
France's allies. When the text of the Franco-Russian Agreement was pub-
lished in December, 1917, the British government hastily pointed out 
that 
Never did we desire, and never did we encourage the idea that 
a bit of Germany should be cut off from the parent State, and 
erected into some kind of independent Republic or independent 
Government of some sort on the left bank of the Rhine, so as 
to make a new buffer state between France and Germany.12 
When the .Allied governments met at Versailles in January, 1919, 
one of the main issues was the future status of the left bank of the 
Rhine. For the French, the occupation of the left bank and the bridge-
heads of the Rhine was an indispensable guarantee for enforcement of 
the treaty and the only assurance against invasion. As early as Novem-
ber, 1918, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the French Commander in Chief of the 
Allied Armies, had insisted that German sovereignty must end at the 
Rhine. On January 10, 1919, he presented his arguments to the command-
ers of the Allied Armies. 
Henceforth the Rhine must be the Western frontier of the 
German peoples. Germany must .be deprived of all access to 
or military utilization of it, that is to say, of all terri-
torial sovereignty on the left bank of this river--in a 
word, of every facility to reach by sudden invasion ... of 
Belgium and Luxemburg, the shores of the North Sea, and 
threaten England; to move around France's natural defenses, 
the Rhine, and the Meuse; to conquer her northern regions 
and approach her northern regions and approach that of 
Paris.13 
To Woodrow Wilson and David Lloyd George, who headed the United 
States and British delegations in Paris, French demands for the 
12 Arthur Balfour, December 19, 1917, Great Britain, Parliamentary 
Debates (Commons), 5th Series, vol. C, col. 2017. 
13 .. Andre Tardieu, The Truth About the Treaty (Indianapolis, 1923), 
p. 146. 
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occupation of the Rhine seemed dangerous and unjustifiable. Colonel 
Edward House, Wilson's aide, reported a conversation on February 9 with 
the British foreign secretary as follows: 
We talked at great length of the French proposal of setting 
up a "Rhenish Republic" as a buffer state between Germany and 
France. The French have but one idea and that is military 
protection. They do not seem to know that ta establish a 
Rhenish Republic against the will of the people would be con-
trary to the principle of self-determination; and that if we 
should establish it, the people could at any time become fed-
erated with the other German States. If we did such a thing, 
we would be treating Germany in one way and the balance of 
the world in another. We would run the danger of having ev-
erything from the Rhine to the Pacific, perhaps including 
Japan, against the Western powers.14 
Britain and the United States were not prepared to submit to French 
demands, but finally agreement was reached on a short-term occupation 
of the left bank of the Rhine as a guarantee for the payment of repara-
tions. To allay French anxiety, Wilson and Lloyd George agreed to 
Anglo-American defense treaties separate from the Versailles settlement. 
Moreover, the Treaty itself dealt at length with the problem. 
The provisions of the Treaty of Versailles regarding the Rhineland 
were as follows: 
Article 42. Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct 
any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on 
the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to 
the East of the Rhine. 
Article 43. In the area defined above the maintenance and 
assembly-Of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, 
and military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of 
all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way 
forbidden. 
Article 44. In case Germany violates in any manner whatever 
the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded 
as committing a hostile act to disturb the peace of the 
world. 
Article 428. As a guarantee for the execution of the present 
14charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (New York, 
1928), vol. IV, p. 345.---
Treaty by Germany, the German territory situated to the west 
of the Rhine, together with the bridgeheads, will be occu-
pied by Allied and Associated troops for a period of fifteen 
years from the coming into force of the present Treaty. 
Article 429. If the conditions of the present Treaty are 
faithfui'iY-carried out by Germany, the occupation referred to 
in Article 428 will be successively restricted as follows: 
(1) At the expiration of five years there will be evac-
uated: the bridgehead of Cologne and the territories north 
of a line running along the Ruhr, then along the railway 
Julich, Duren, Euskirchen, Rheinbach, thence along the road 
Rheinbach to Sinzig, and reaching the Rhine at the confluence 
with the Ahr; the roads, railways and places mentioned above 
being excluded from the area evacuated. 
(2) At the expiration of ten years there will be evac-
uated: the bridgehead of Coblenz and the .territories north 
of a line to be drawn from the intersection between the fron-
tiers of Belgium, Germany and Holland, running about from 4 
kilometres south of Aix-la-Chapelle, then to and following 
the crest of Forst Gemiind, then east of the railway of the 
Urft Valley, then along Blankenheim, Valdorf, Dreis, Ulmen to 
and following the Moselle from Bremm to Nehren, then passing 
by Kappel and Simmern, then following the ridge of the 
heights between Simmern and the Rhine and reaching this river 
at Bacharach; all the places valleys roads and railways men-
tioned above being excluded from the area evacuated. 
(3) At the expiration of fifteen years there will be 
evacuated the bridgehead of Mainz, the bridgehead of Kehl 
and the remainder of the German territory under occupation. 
If at that date the guarantees against unprovoked ag-
gression by Germany are not considered sufficient by the 
Allied and Associated Governments, the evacuation of the oc-
cupying troops may be delayed to the extent regarded as nec-
essary for the purpose of obtaining the required guarantees. 
Article 430. In case either during the occupation or after 
the expiration of the fifteen years referred to above the 
Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe 
the whole or part of her obligations under the present Treaty 
with regard to reparation, the whole or part of the areas 
specified in Article 429 will be reoccupied immediately by 
the Allied and Associated forces. 
Article 431. If before the expiration of the period of fif-
teen years Germany complies with all the undertakings re-
sulting from the present Treaty, the occupying forces will be 
withdrawn immediately. 
8 
In addition, the Anglo-American treaties recognized that since Articles 
42, 43, and 44 might 
not at first provide adequate.security and protection to 
France, the United States of America shall be bound to come 
immediately to her assistance in the event of any unprovoked 
15 
movement of aggression against her being made by Germany. 
While the negotiations concerning the Rhine were in progress, 
French General Charles-Marie Mangin, the Commander of the French Tenth 
Army, attempted to present the Peace Conference with the fait accompli 
9 
of a Rhenish Republic. The separatist movement among Rhineland Germans 
was fostered by the shock of defeat, their suspicion of an anti-Catholic 
policy by the new government of Berlin, and the desire of the industri-
alists to evade the burden of reparations. Demonstrations for separa-
tion from Germany in the Rhenish cities of Coblenz, Mainz, Trier, 
Speyer, Wiesbaden, and Aachen supported the separatist leader, Dr. Hans 
Dorten. When the Rhineland Republic was declared at Coblenz on May 17, 
1919, Lloyd George and Wilson, who had heard of French complicity in 
the movement, complained, and Mangin was recalled. Without active 
French support, the Rhineland Republic could not last. The spirit of 
separatism continued in the Rhineland until 1923 but gradually faded as 
a result of Prussian activities and a lack of understanding by the 
French themselves. 16 However, Dorten justified the somewhat dubious 
course he had taken on the grounds that "the disturber of peace on the 
Rhine is Prussia. We Rhinelanders are Germans, but we are not 
Prussians. 1117 
When the Treaty of Versailles came before the French Parliament, 
there was considerable criticism of the compromise Premier Georges 
15united States Department of State, The Treaty of Versailles and 
After: Annotations of the Text of the Treaty (Washington, 1947), 
p. 148. 
16 Hans A. Dorten, "The Rhineland Movement," Foreign Affairs, vol. 
III (April, 1925), p. 408. 
17Ibid., p. 410. 
10 
Clemenceau had made in trading occupation of the Rhineland for defense 
treaties with the United States and Britain. Many members of Parliament 
supported Foch's contention that the Rhineland should be independent of 
Germany, but few were willing to renounce the Treaty of Versailles and 
face Germany alone. The only real crisis in the French debate came 
when news arrived that the United States Senate had delayed voting on 
the ratification of the treaty. Clemenceau then took the opportunity 
to justify his work. He argued that there was no such thing as a com-
pletely secure frontier. He added that he had tried to place Germany's 
frontier at the Rhine, but the Allies objected strongly, and the demil-
itarization of the Rhineland was the best France could get. 18 One of 
the most valid criticisms of tQe treaty came from Jules Delahaye, a 
Royalist, who warned that the irritation and humiliation of the treaty 
would be sufficient to cause trouble from a Germany which still had the 
19 
capacity for revenge. The best organized opposition to the Treaty of 
Versailles came from the Socialists, who felt that rather than punishing 
Germany, support should have been given to those democratic elements in 
Germany who recognized their guilt. 2° Finally, most members of Parlia-
ment unenthusiastically accepted the view that Clemenceau had negotiated 
the best possible treaty considering the attitude of Britain and.the 
United States. The final vote registered 372 deputies in favor of the. 
treaty, 53 against, and 74 abstentions. Socialists comprised 51 of 
18 ~ Georges Clemenceau, September ~5, !919, France, Journal officiel: 
Debats parlementaires:-Chambre des Deputes, 1919, pp. 4572-4586, 
(hereafter cited as Debats). 
19 Jules Delahaye, October 2, 1919, ibid., pp. 4717-4718. 
20 Debate of August 28, 1919, ibid., pp. 4049-4058. 
11 
those voting against the treaty and one-third of those abstaining, 21 
In 1920, the news came across the Atlantic that Clemenceau's sac-
rifice had been in vain, The American Treaty of Guarantee and the 
Treaty of Versailles were rejected by the United States Senate in March, 
The treaties had become the victims of political bickering among the 
Democrats and Republicans, personal hostility between the President and 
the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and traditional 
American suspicion of foreign entanglements, Moreover, Clemenceau had 
made a serious mistake in the original negotiations at Paris when he 
agreed to make the enforcement of the British treaty contingent on 
American ratification. For on these gro~nds, the British were not r~­
quired to honor their treaty of guarantee, 22 
Faced with a diplomatic retreat by Britain and the United States, 
and left without the material guarantee of separating the Rhineland 
from Germany, France began to seek pledges of military assistance as 
the best remaining means of security, The first treaties France sought 
were with countries such as Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, which 
had common borders with Germany and would be subject to German inva-
sion, The French considered the League of Nations inadequate for pro-
viding immediate help against Germany, and they hoped that the nations 
which were the most threatened by Germany could enter into special 
accords and military agreements that could meet any challenge, 
Belgium was the first candidate for France's new alliance system, 
The Franco-Belgian agreement was signed on September 7, 1920, and 
21 King, Foch versus Clemenceau, pp. 113-125, 
22Jordan, Great Britain, France, and the German Problem, pp, 38-39. 
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registered with the League as the Treaty of Versailles required, but 
the military details were kept secret. The alliance, according to 
Belgium and France, was "purely defensive" and referred "exclusively to 
the case of unprovoked aggression." Their object was "to reinforce the 
guaranties of peace and security resulting from the Covenant of the 
League of Nations." The guarantees of assistance were not automatic 
since each nation reserved the right to determine "in each case whether 
the eventuality contemplated by the present understanding has in fact 
arisen. 1123 
France's next alliance was with Poland. Of the new nations created 
after World War I, Poland had acquired the largest share of German ter-
ritory and thus might expect to be the target of German revenge and re-
vision of the Treaty of Versailles. The Polish agreement provided that 
in the event of an unprovoked attack, "the two Governments shall take 
concerted measures for the defense of their territory and the protection 
f h . 1 . . . 1124 o t eir eg1t1mate interests. In Central Europe, France relied on 
what came to be called the Little Entente of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, 
and Romania. The Little Entente was directed toward maintaining the 
settlement of World War I, and France formally recognized their common 
interest through treaties with Czechoslovakia in 1924, Romania in 1926, 
and Yugoslavia in 1927. At last it seemed that France had found a sub-
stitute for its prewar alliance with Russia, since Poland and the Little 
Entente could provide continental armies which could collaborate with 
23World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, Postwar Political Alignments 
(Boston, 1923) vol. VI, no. 2, pp. 95-100. 
24 Stephan Horak, Poland's International Affairs, 1919-1960 
(Bloomington, Indiana, 1964), pp. 149-150. 
13 
the French. 25 
Though searching for alliances on the Continent, France still 
wanted to preserve its entente with Britain. Relations between the two 
nations were complicated by the fact that Britain was interested in 
promoting German economic recovery and stimulating a European market, 
while France, although hoping for large reparations, feared that German 
prosperity might inspire a challenge to the Treaty of Versailles. The 
British were less inclined than the French to use coercion against 
Germany. For example, when the French ordered troops into some southern 
German towns because they thought that the number of troops Germany had 
sent into the area to quell a Communist disturbance was excessive, the 
British protested and asked for French assurances that they would in-
form the Allies and obtain their consent before taking such an important 
26 
step. 
Another strain in relations with Britain occurred when France and 
Belgium occupied the Ruhr on January 11, 1923. Under the Treaty of 
Versailles, they could invoke th:lsright of intervention whenever the 
Reparation Commission certified that Germany was behind in reparation 
payments. Britain and the United States were opposed to this French 
action which they considered provocative and counter-productive. In 
fact, the French occupation of the Ruhr had serious economic repercus-
sions for Germany and the world. In response, the German government 
25Arnold J. Toynbee, ed., Survey of International Affairs, 1924 
(London, 1928), pp. 440-456, (hereafter cited as SIA); Felix John 
Vondracek, The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, T9T9-1935 (New York, 
1937), pp. 211-216. 
26 Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars (New York, 
1966), p. 43, fn, 19. 
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mounted a program of passive resistance and organized the destruction 
of the mark. In order to extract some profit, French Premier Raymond 
Poincare was finally forced to send French and Belgian workers into the 
Ruhr. 
The Ruhr episode was the last time France acted against Germany in 
defiance of Britain. 27 The exchange of notes between Britain and 
France over the Ruhr incident emphasized the difference in their views. 
The British advised France that 
an undertaking freely entered into, because acknowledged to 
be just and reasonable, stands, in practice, on a different 
footing and offers better prospects of faithful execution, 
than an engagement subscribed under the compulsion of an ul-
timatum, and protested against at the very moment of signa-
ture as beyond the signatory's capacity to make good.28 
Poincare countered that it was 
German resistance which has prolonged an unfortunate situa-
tion; all those who have encouraged German resistance have 
contributed to this prolongation, and all those who have not 
discouraged German resistance have encouraged her.29 
It was only with remorse that France submitted to the British interpre-
tation of the Treaty of Versailles. In his bitterness over Britain's 
lack of enthusiasm for the Ruhr occupation, Poincare complained to the 
Chamber of Deputies that 
We are placed at the mercy of powers less interested than we 
in the execution of the treaty. • . • And this treaty, 
whose execution relies essentially on the good will of the 
27shirer, ~Collapse of the Third Republic, pp. 148-149. 
28wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars, pp. 90-91, fn. 20, 
which cites British Parliamentary (Command)Papers, Cmd. 1943, Corres-
pondence ~ the Allied Governments Respecting Reparation Payments Er, 
Germany. 
29 Ibid. 
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Allies, has been perverted and corrupted. 30 
After the furor caused by the occupation of the Ruhr had settled, 
it appeared that there might be some hope for lessening the hostility 
between France and Germany. The first test of any growing trust in 
Germany came as the date approached for the evacuation of the northern 
zone of the Rhineland in January, 1925. Withdrawal of Allied forces 
had been made contingent upon German reparations and disarmament. 
German hope for complete evacuation of the Rhineland was lost on Decem-
ber 28, 1924, when the Allies decided to delay the evacuation because. 
Germany had failed to fulfill its treaty obligations. Specific de-
faults mentioned were 
reconstruction under another form of the Great General Staff; 
recruiting and training of short-term recruits; failure to 
demilitarize factories; retention of surplus war material; 
failure to reorganize the police; failure to take all the ad-
ministrative and legislative measure~ demanded by the 
Allies.31 
Premier Edouard Herriot described the occupation of the Rhineland as 
the only "guarantee of French security and of the Treaty. Our estab-
lishment on the Rhine is the essential and, alas, the last condition of 
our security. 1132 This Allied refusal to evacuate the northern zone 
prompted the German government to of fer a pact for all nations inter-
ested in the Rhine. 
Consequently, the Locarno Pact was signed in October, 1925. The 
spirit of Locarno, which was distinguished by harmony and accomodation, 
seemed to indicate that Germany was.finally being accepted in the 
30Raymond Poincare, January 18, 1924, Debats, 1924, pp. 155-156. 
31 SIA, 1925, vol. II, p. 182. 
32 Ibid., p. 15. 
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community of Western nations. The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee confirmed 
the inviolability of Germany's frontier with France and Belgium; this 
was further strengthened by the adherence of Britain and Italy as guar-
antors. Germany, Belgium, and France agreed that they would "in no 
case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other" 
except in cases of violations of their treaties, "flagrant violations" 
of the demilitarized zone, or sanctions taken by the League. In the 
case of a "flagrant violation" of the demilitarization of the Rhineland, 
each of the signatory powers agreed to aid the threatened nation as 
soon as it was satisfied that the 
violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and 
that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or of 
the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed 
forces in the demilitarized zone immediate action is neces-
sary. 
If the nature of the violation proved doubtful, the Council of the 
League of Nations could decide what action was appropriate when one na-
tion refused to submit to arbitration or to accept the judgment of the 
League and attacked another. The treaty would come into force after it 
had been ratified by all the signatory nations and Germany became a 
member of th~ League. The Locarno Pact was intended to remain in force 
until the League determined that it was no longer needed. Separate 
arbitration conventions which provided for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes by a special court, the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice, or the League were signed by Germany with Belgium, France, Poland, 
and Czechoslovakia. 33 
On the surface, it appeared that Locarno had contributed to French 
33Ibid., pp. 49-57. 
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security, but there was a fatal flaw in the terminology of the pact. 
In reality, .France was limited by Britain's judgment of what constituted 
a flagrant violation. If Britain decided that a case was doubtful, 
League action might take too long and be ineffective when it came. 
Furthermore, Germany had only signed arbitration conventions with Poland 
and Czechoslovakia and had proved unwilling to underwrite the status quo 
in the East. It could thus be inferred that those eastern borders were 
subject to change. If the theory that Britain entered the Locarno Pact 
to restrain the French from rash action is accepted, then it had the 
effect of weakening France. The spirit of Locarno raised French hopes 
fol;' peace and German hopes that further revisions could be made in the 
disabilities theysl,lffered under the Treaty of Versailles. With their 
admission to tlle League in 1926, the Germans began to anticipate full 
equality. 
Hence they began to press for removal of all Allied troops in the 
Rhineland or a reduction in the n\Ullber of occupying forces which they 
were required to support. The German government argued that it was an 
equal member of the League and that all obligations under the Treaty of 
Versailles had been met except reparations, which were subject to the 
Dawes Plan. In a conciliatory note on November 14, 1925, the Allies 
responded that 
in the Locarno spirit of confidence, faith, and good will, 
the Goverrunents participating in the occupation of the 
Rhineland tel;'ritory have decided to introduce into the occu-
pation all the alleviations compatible with the Treaty of 
Versailles. 34 · 
The evacuation o.f the northern zcme of the Rhineland was completed on 
34Ibid., pp. 192 .... 193. 
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January 31, 1926. On September 5, Britain and France announced that 
the occupation forces in the Rhineland would be reduced from 70,000 to 
35 60,000 men. 
On January 1, 1928, German President Paul van Hindenburg officially 
raised the question of the complete evacuation of the Rhineland, and 
the same sentiment was echoed by Chancellor Gustav Stresemann in the 
Reichstag on January 30. Stresemann declared: 
It must be clearly understood that it is precisely this in-
sistence of the continuation of the Rhineland occupation that 
has depreciated the Locarno Treaty in the eyes of the public. 
Much had been said about discarding machine guns and cannons. 
But machine guns and cannons are still staring in the Rhine-
land in the face of a Power with which one cooperates in the 
League of Nations and with which no differences of a serious 
political character exist. The discussion of the evacuation 
question is not only a formal right of Germany under the Ver-
sailles Treaty; it is also a logical consequence, though not 
expressly formulated, of a treaty excluding the use of force 
by one country against the other. At one time Locarno was 
looked upon as the beginning of a new era. Today, however, 
enthusiasm has had to give way to scepticism in demanding the 
evacuation of the Rhineland .... 36 
Preoccupied with their own security, the French preferred to delay the 
evacuation of the Rhineland, but their capacity to do this was circum-
vented when the British and Belgians announced in September that they 
intended to begin withdrawing their troops by the end of 1929. The 
French were forced to compromise. On August 30, France, Britain, and 
Belgium sent a note to Stresemann which stipulated the conditions for 
evacuation. Britain and Belgium would evacuate the second zone when 
Germany accepted the principle of the Young Plan for reparations and 
evacuation of the third zone would come with formal German ratification 
35 Ibid., p. 108. 
36stephen Heald, ed., Documents on International Affairs, 1928 
(London, 1929), p. 35, (hereafter cited as DIA). 
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of the plan. In accordance with this agreement, the last Allied troops 
left the Rhineland on June 30, 1926. 37 
In the eyes of many, by giving up the occupation of the Rhineland 
five years before the deadline in the Treaty of Versailles, France was 
making a mistake. Louis Marin, who opposed any concessions to the 
Germans, expressed the sentiment of the Right when he theorized that 
the removal of French troops from the Rhineland meant "the loss of all 
38 
controls, of all security, and of all the guarantees we have." For-
eign Minister Aristide Briand defended the government's action by 
blaming the impatience of Britain and Belgium. He explained that "Our 
British friends wish to leave. Our Belgian friends wish to leave. We 
do not want to be separated from friends who have always been faithful 
to 1139 us. 
Denied the territorial buffer of the Rhineland, France decided to 
build the most extensive line of fortifications that the world had ever 
seen along its border with Germany, from Switzerland to the Belgian-
Luxembourg border. The first appropriations for the fortifications, 
called the Maginot Line after Andre Maginot, the Minister of War, were 
approved on December 28, 1929. Maginot advised the Chamber of Deputies 
that it was indispensable that the northeastern border of France have 
strong fortifications before the evacuation of the Rhineland. 
However, the Maginot Line did not guard France's border with 
Belgium. The general view held that by continuing the French 
37SIA, 1929, pp. 181, 185, 188. 
38Louis Marin, March 27, 1930, Debats, 1930, p. 1318. 
39A . . d B . d N b 8 1929 .. b 1 29 3055 rist1 e rian , ovem er , , De ats, 9 · , p. . 
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fortifications along the Belgian frontier, France would present the ap-
pearance of abandoning an ally. Marshal Henri Petain, who dominated 
French military theory of the 1930's, always maintained, therefore, 
that it would be necessary to meet the Germans in Belgium. By 1935, 
the eighty-seven miles of fortifications that were completed had cost 
seven billion francs. The real danger of the Maginot Line was that it 
encouraged the French to develop a kind of defensive mentality or com-
plex. Most Frenchmen were susceptible to the notion that the Germans 
could somehow be stopped with little loss.of life and that the French 
army was safe behind the Maginot Line, Therefore, they were likely to 
neglect offensive weapons and the development of an apnored force. 40 
There were many in the United States and Britain who expected 
Germany to show gratitude after the evacuation of the Rhineland. How-
ever, just the opposite occurred, as incident after incident kindled 
the embers of Franco-German distrust. By the fall of 1930, Adolf 
Hitler's Nazi Party had become the second largest in Germany, and it 
was apparent that the German people felt that the concession from France 
had come too late. In January, 1931, Hindenburg announced that Germany 
claimed equal rights and would no longer pay reparations. Germany's 
refusal to pay and the world depression precipitated the Hoover Mora-
torium on the payment of war debts. In 1932, Britain and France signed 
an agreement with Germany which abolished reparations, and they made 
their last token payments to the United States in 1933. 41 
In March, 1931, Germany announced that a customs union with Austria 
40Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle: France 1940 (Boston, 1969), 
pp. 26-32; Shirer, The""""Corrapse of the Third RepUbIIc, pp. 184-186. 
41shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic, pp. 150-152. 
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had been concluded. The peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain 
prohibited any action that would directly or indirectly violate the in-
dependence of Austria without the consent of the Council of the League 
of Nations. There was automatic French opposition to anything that 
might strengthen Germany, and the idea was abandoned when the Permanent 
Court of International Justice ruled that the union was illegal. 42 
In 1932, the Disarmament Conference provided another forum for 
Germany to demand the end of restrictions associated with the Treaty of 
Versailles. The German army was limited to 100,000 men, but there was 
not any real means of enforcing the quota. Moreover, Germany had been 
assured in Article 8 of the League Covenant that its disarmament was 
the prelude to the general limitation of arms by all nations. Yet 
Britain and France always found arguments to prove that their own dis-
armament was impractical and unwise. The German delegation demanded 
the end of discrimination and subsequently broke up the conference over 
the issue of equality. Britain and France continued the half-hearted 
discussions, but the French were never willing to authorize any increase 
. G 43 in erman arms. 
On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler became the Chancellor of Germany. 
It was obvious that Hitler was not going to be content with a modest 
~ole for Germany in European affairs and that he would do everything 
possible to revise the hated Diktat of the Treaty of Versailles. On 
October 6, 1933, he presented a memorandum to Britain and the United 
States in which he demanded full German equality. Hitler declared that 
42Wolfers, Britain and France Between~~, pp. 112-113. 
43Jordan, Great Britain, France,~~ German Problem, pp. 149-
153. 
Merely to increase the quantity of arms allowed by the Treaty 
of Versailles by doubling the figures fixed in the Treaty 
would mean a discrimination which Germany cannot accept and 
would not satisfy her need for security. Germany wishes 
either to have full liberty or to be subjected to the same 
qualitative restrictions as other countries.44 
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German willingness to negotiate rearmament concessions ended on October 
14 when Hitler announced that Germany was withdrawing from the League. 
He further called for general elections and a referendum on government 
policy. Throughout the campaign, Hitler emphasized the pacific inten-
tions of his people and reaffirmed his commitment to the Treaty of 
Locarno and his desire for friendship with France and Czechoslovakia. 
The vote in the general elections and for the referendum was overwhelm-
. 1 . f f h N . I l" 45 ing y in avor o t e azi government s po icy. The reaction of the 
French government was appropriately pessimistic. Joseph Paul-Boncour, 
the Foreign Minister, acknowledged that the Nazi victory had crushed 
the forces within Germany that offered some possibility of a political 
rapprochement with France. 46 Thus, the theory of deux Allemagnes--one 
Germany that was militaristic and hostile to France and another that 
favored democracy and peace--was buried. 
On April 17, 1934, Louis Barthou, who had succeeded Paul-Boncour 
as Foreign Minister in February, attempted to redirect France's drifting 
foreign policy. At last the French government decided to resist British 
pressures for the legalization of German rearmament and for the reduc-
tion of that of France. The French desire for peace, he said, "must not 
44DIA, 1933, p. 277. 
45 rbid., pp. 288, 314-316. 
46Ibid., p. 310. 
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be confounded with the abandonment of her defense. 1147 Upon recognizing 
the failure of the Disarmament Conference, Barthou started a series of 
diplomatic moves to strengthen French alliances against Germany. 
First, he proposed an Eastern Locarno which would guarantee 
Germany's eastern border as the Locarno Pact of 1925 had done for the 
west. Both Germany and Poland refused, and Barthou was assassinated 
before he could complete a military alliance with the Soviet Union. 
His successor, Pierre Laval, was suspicious of the Soviet Union, but he 
followed Barthou's plan and at the same time hoped that Germany could 
be directed against the Soviet Union. Laval really preferred an 
alliance with Fascist Italy. 
Accordingly, a Franco-Italian Pact was signed on January 7, 1935. 
Benito Mussolini was interested in French support if Hitler threatened 
Austria, and France wanted Italian aid on its border with Germany. In 
the secret talks between the Italian and French General Staffs which 
followed the political agreement, General Maurice Gamelin, who repre-
sented the French, reported that the military guarantee covered all 
areas of mutual interest from the Alps .to Africa. 48 France also made 
some concessions to Italian interests in North Africa. After the Italo-
Abyssinian War broke out in October, there would be a great deal of con-
cern about what sort of carte blanche Laval might have given to 
Mussolini. In public, however, Laval insisted that he intended only to 
relinquish French economic interests in Abyssinia and that he supposed 
that Italian actions there would be peaceful and beneficial toward the 
47Ibid., pp. 382-383. 
48Gamelin, Servir, vol. II, pp. 162-167. 
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E h . . 49 t iop1ans. 
On January 13, 1935, one issue which could have caused trouble 
between France and Germany was settled when the residents of the Saar 
voted for reunion with the Reich. The Treaty of Versailles had required 
Germany to cede the government of the Saar to the League for fifteen 
years, and France was given the right to exploit the coal mines in the 
area as compensation for damages from World War I. Hitler campaigned 
to convince the Saarlanders that they were welcome within the Reich re-
gardless of their political views. To soothe the apprehensions of the 
French, he declared that 
The question of the Saar is the only territorial question 
which separates us from France to-day. Once it has been 
solved there remains no visible reasonable ground why two 
great nations should continue to quarrel to all eternity.SO 
However, Hitler's pose of moderation and satisfaction did not last 
long. On March 10, General Hermann Goering publicly announced the 
existence of the German Air Force. The report did not especially sur-
prise anyone and was subsequently overshadowed by Hitler's proclamation 
six days later. The German law of March 16, 1935, was succinct and 
daring; it proclaimed "universal liability to defense duty" and an-
nounced that the peacetime strength of the army would be twelve corps 
and thirty-six divisions. In an accompanying statement to the German 
people, Hitler surveyed diplomatic history since the Treaty of Ver-
sailles and concluded that the German government had more than fulfilled 
its obligations to disarm and that Britain and France were the parties 
actually guilty of breaking the treaty. He said that his announcement 
49SIA, 1935, pp. 109-110. 
SODIA, ~, p. 30. 
was necessary 
in order.to give the German people the .conviction and other 
States the knowledge that the safeguarding of the honor and 
security of the German Reich henceforth will be again en-
trusted to the sole charge of the German nation. 
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He assured the world, however, that Germany would never "proceed beyond 
the safeguarding of German honour and the freedom of the Reich. 1151 
Hitler's bold breach of the military restrictions of the Treaty of 
Versailles produced an anti-German front. On April 11, representatives 
of Italy, France, and Britain met in Stresa to decide what could be 
done about Hitler. Their final resolution contained all the customary 
platitudes but accomplished nothing more than turning the problem over 
to the League. Britain and Italy reaffirmed their intention to fulfill 
all their obligations under the Treaty of Locarno. With France, they 
declared that the object of their policy was "the collective maintenance 
of peace within the framework of the League of Nations" and opposition 
"by all practicable means, [to] any unilateral repudiation of treaties 
which may endanger the peace of Europe. 1152 
Furthermore, the Stresa powers formulated an indictment of Germany 
which was then adopted by the Council of the League of Nations. They 
recognized that the Military Law of March 16 violated the principle of 
international law wh,ich required "the scrupulous respect of all treaty 
obligations." Therefore, a nation could not free itself from treaty 
obligations or modify a treaty without the consent of the other con-
tracting parties. The resolution concluded with a request that a 
conunittee be appointed 
51 Ibid., pp. 58-64. 
52sIA, 1935, pp. 156-161. 
to propose • • . measures to render the Covenant more effec-
tive in the reorganization of collective security and to de-
fine in particular the economic and financial measures which 
might be applied, should in the future a State, whether a 
Member of the League of Nations or not, endanger peace by the 
unilateral repudiation of its international obligations.53 
The value of this moral condemnation of Hitler's action was cer-
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tainly questionable, yet the Stresa front did appear to draw Italy into 
the anti-German association that France wanted to mold. Germany was 
diplomatically isolated except for a nonaggression pact with Poland. 
The last great power that could contribute to France's anti-German con-
cert was the Soviet Union. 
On May 2, 1935, the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance was 
signed. The two nations agreed on immediate consultation if it appeared 
that either might be threatened by aggression. In the case of unpro-
voked aggression when the League failed to take action, they agreed to 
come to each other's immediate aid and assistance. The language of the 
treaty referred only to an "Etat europeen" as the potential aggressor, 
but Germany was clearly the European state that worried both France and 
the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia became the third member of the alli-
ance against Germany through a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the Soviet 
Union signed on May 16, 1935. The military protocol that accompanied 
the Czech-Soviet Pact stipulated that the treaty would go into effect 
1 1. f F 1 . 54 on y ranee a so gave assistance. 
In 1919 Woodrow Wilson had promised that France would "never again 
feel that hers was a lonely peril [and] would never again have to ask 
53oIA, 1935, pp. 98-99. 
54Williarn E. Scott, Alliance Against Hitler: The Origins E!_~ 
Franco-Soviet Pact (Durham, North Carolina, 1962), pp. 269-275. 
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the question who would come to her assistance" as she stood "at the 
frontier of freedom. 1155 Yet in spite of all the paraphernalia of col-
lective security, France was still alone on the Rhine in 1935. Irani-
cally, the impressive list of treaties amassed from 1919 to 1935 had 
the effect of limiting France's freedom to act against aggression since 
each treaty added loopholes and delays to the system of collective 
security. Germany was thus able to move against the legal flaws in 
France's shield without triggering the defense mechanism. 
55 Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers 
of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace (New York, 1927), vol. I, pp. 392, 
406. 
CHAPTER II 
THE WAY OF A SOMNAMBULIST 
The Stresa Conference, which aligned Great Britain, Italy, and 
France against Germany, appeared ominous to many members of the German 
government, but Hitler was undaunted. He gave his response to the 
Stresa Conference and the League before the Reichstag on May 21, 1935. 
The general tone of the speech was peaceful, but there were several 
points that warned France of future trouble. In a summary, he formu-
lated the basic German views as follows: 
The German Government reject the Geneva resolution of April 
17. The Versailles dictate was unilaterally broken, 
and thereby rendered invalid as regards the points at issue, 
by those Powers who could not decide to carry out in their 
turn the disarmament which was imposed on Germany and which 
should have followed in their case by virtue of the Treaty. 
The German Government . . . have on their part re-
nounced those articles of the Versailles Treaty which, be-
cause of the one-sided burden these laid on Germany contrary 
to the provisions of the Treaty, have constitued a discrimi-
nation against Germany for an unlimited period of time. 
Hitler offered to "uphold and fulfill all obligations arising out of 
the Locarno Treaty, so long as the other partners are on their side 
ready to stand by that pact." He concluded his promise to respect the 
demilitarization of the Rhineland with a warning to France: 
In respecting the demilitarized zone the German Government 
consider their action as a contribution to the appeasement of 
Europe, which contribution is of an unheard-of-hardness for a 
sovereign State. But they feel bound to point out that the 
continual increase of troops on the other side can in no way 
be regarded as a complement to these endeavours . 
. ·~ 
He acknowledged the necessity of "the law of perpetual evolution by 
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keeping open the way to treaty revision" and warned that "the suppres-
sion of every necessary change" would become "the preparation for future 
explosions." As an inducement for British friendship, he offered "to 
supplement the Locarno Treaty with an air agreement" and pledged that 
"Germany has not the intention or the necessity or the means to partici-
pate in any new naval rivalry." He also offered to participate in any 
limitation or abolition of armament if the plan gave Germany equality 
with Britain and France. 1 
Next, Hitler employed the tactic of dividing his opponents by com-
plaining to the British government about the incompatibility of the 
Franco-Soviet Pact and the Treaty of Locarno. The German government 
felt that it must consider "whether the new treaty was in harmony with 
the obligations towards Germany" which France had assumed in the Treaty 
of Locarno, since the Franco-Soviet Pact, according to the German inter-
pretation, referred only to the case of armed conflict with Germany. 
Thereby France claimed the right to take military action against Germany 
without a recommendation from the Council of the League. Military ac-
tion taken by France under these conditions would constitute a flagrant 
violation of the Treaty of Locarno. The German government hoped that 
all the other signatory powers would recognize that the Tre~ty of 
Locarno could not be modified in such a manner because it was "so 
important for relations between Western European Powers that no doubt, 
however slight, and no wicertainty, must be allowed to arise as to the 
interpretations of its clauses. 112 
1 DIA, 1935, pp. 171-175. 
2Ibid., pp. 264-267. 
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On June 25, the French government gave its response to the German 
memorandum and emphasized that 
The Rhine Pact, as an element of collective security, is so 
much an essential basis of the general policy of France that 
no French Government would have risked, by their own action, 
the introduction of an element of doubt with regard to it. 
In fact, during the period of negotiations with the Soviet Union, the 
French government had been preoccupied with avoiding anything which 
might have invalidated even indirectly the Treaty of Locarno. The 
Franco-Soviet Pact was "perfectly consistent with the obligations re-
sulting from the Treaty of Locarno." It was not true that France 
claimed the right to decide who was the aggressor in the event of a con-
flict between the Soviet Union and Germany. France would not have 
signed the Franco-Soviet Treaty without first being certain that it was 
not inconsistent with the Treaty of Locarno because "the French Govern-
ment's anxiety in no way to invalidate the application of the Locarno 
Treaty is the guiding principle of their whole policy. 113 During July, 
the British, Italian, and Belgian governments informed Germany that 
they were in agreement with the French and that they were satisfied that 
nothing in the Franco-Soviet Pact conflicted with the Treaty of 
4 Locarno, 
For the next six months, Hitler said little publicly about the 
Franco-Soviet Pact and the demilitarization of the Rhineland. Suffi-
cient difficulties were developing between the Stresa powers to make 
his waiting worthwhile. Furthermore, he used the opportunity to ap-
proach Britain directly for a naval agreement which would remove some 
31bid., pp. 267-270. 
4Ibid., pp. 270-272. 
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of Germany's legal restrictions under the Treaty of Versailles. The 
French were irritated by what they considered a betrayal by Britain and 
refused to participate in any legal revision of the treaty. Neverthe-
less, the British were eager to take advantage of Hitler's offer to 
limit the size of the Germany navy to thirty-five percent of the British 
fleet. Actually, Germany was no longer under any binding limitation, 
since achieving one-third of the strength of the British navy would tax 
German productive capacity for several years. Therefore, the naval 
agreement was not so important in avoiding an arms race as it was detri-
mental to the overall state of Anglo-French relations, since it provoked 
resentment and mistrust from France just before the League was to face 
its greatest challenge to date, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. 5 
The necessity of responding to Italian aggression posed a quandary 
for the French. They could either go along with the majority of nations 
in the League who were willing to impose sanctions against Italy, or 
they could try to maintain Italian support against Hitler by somehow 
keeping the League from acting. As Foreign Minister, Laval attempted to 
follow both courses and succeeded only in damaging the prestige of the 
League while offending Italy. If France had been willing at this point 
to support the League in necessary military action, the example certain-
ly would have helped later in persuading the League to act against 
Hitler. After the League Assembly agreed in October that Italy had re-
sorted to aggressive war and voted to apply sanctions under Article 16 
of the Covenant, it became increasingly obvious that it was necessary to 
do something more about the Ethiopian problem. Laval persuaded the 
5 SIA, ~' pp. 178-193. 
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British Foreign Minister, Samuel Hoare, to adopt a plan which would 
have given two-thirds of Ethiopia to Mussolini. Unfortunately for Laval 
and Hoare, the details of their scheme were published prematurely in the 
Paris papers. The hostile reaction of the British public was so intense 
that Hoare was forced to resign, and any hope for the Hoare-Laval plan 
was abandoned. Although the League decided to apply limited economic 
sanctions against Italy, oil, the most necessary product for the war 
effort, was not placed on the embargo list. French hesitancy was mostly 
responsible for the failure of the League to deal effectively with the 
Italian invasion of Ethiopia; the consequences of inaction were grave 
for both France and world peace. The League of Nations had shown that 
the sanctions it was able to apply could not prevent aggression. In 
depriving Ethiopia of any outside assistance, France had failed to live 
up to the doctrine of collective security which had been the corner-
stone of its foreign policy since the end of World War I. Whatever sol-
idarity against Hitler might have existed at Stresa, it was gone as far 
as Italy was concerned. Relations between France and Britain were 
strained, and large sections of public opinion in each nation blamed 
the other's selfishness for the impotence at Geneva. 6 
While public attention was focused on Ethiopia, German military 
preparations were initiated in the Rhineland, and by the fall of 1935 
several French diplomatic and military sources had sounded the alarm. 
On October 21, General Maurice Gamelin, the Army Chief of Staff, sug-
gested to the Foreign Office that there was sufficient evidence to indi-
cate that the remilitarization of the Rhineland would come before the 
6 ~ ·' Rene Albrecht-Carrie, France, Europe, and the Two World Wars 
(Geneva, 1960), pp. 284-291. 
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autumn of 1936. 7 On November 21, Andre Fran~ois-Poncet, the French am-
bassador in Berlin, held a conference with Hitler during which he had 
planned to give the Fuhrer assurances that the Franco-Soviet Treaty was 
not in conflict with the Treaties of Versailles or Locarno. Instead, 
Franyois-Poncet reported that Hitler's "violence in criticizing the 
Franco-Soviet Pact left me with no doubt as to his future intentions" 
for the remilitarization of the Rhineland. In a long dispatch to Paris 
on November 26, Franrois-Poncet asked what would happen when the Rhine-
land was remilitarized and suggested that it would be best to ask Hitler 
openly what he intended. Then it would be possible to threaten armed 
retaliation or permit the Germans to send only a few troops in return 
for their pledge not to build fortifications. However, the ambassador's 
suggestions were rejected, probably because the French feared that if 
they raised the possibility of some revision, the entire structure of 
the Locarno Treaty might crumble, relieving Britain and Italy of their 
responsibilities. 8 On December 26, Gamelin again warned the Foreign 
Office about German preparations in the Rhineland. He reported a marked 
increase in the construction of barracks and the evacuation of barracks 
that had been used by the civil government. 9 By the beginning of 1936, 
it was apparent that the possibility of the remilitarization of the 
Rhineland could not be overlooked any longer. 
The British reaction to these developments was of great concern for 
France, but French unwillingness to discuss the possibility of 
7Gamelin, Servir, vol. II, pp. 194-195. 
8Franrois-Poncet, The Faithful Years, pp. 188-189. 
9Gamelin, Servir, vol. II, p. 195. 
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rernilitarization in a truly straightforward manner with the British in-
hibited their efforts to formulate a unified policy. On January 10, 
Charles Corbin, the French ambassador in London, reported that British 
officials were only somewhat uneasy about the daily attack by German 
· t th d "l"t · d zone and the Franco-Sov1"et Pact. 10 newspapers aga1ns e ern1 1 ar1ze 
Furthermore, in Corbin's opinion, it was impossible to persuade the 
British to examine seriously the German situation in the Rhineland be-
ll fore the Italian-Ethiopian conflict was resolved. The next day, 
Corbin was instructed to inform the British that two German army crops 
had been assigned to the Rhineland and that a full scale occupation 
might occur as early as January 30 in order to coincide with the anni-
versary of Hitler's corning to power. 12 
In a note for the instruction of its arnb~ssadors in Europe, the 
French Foreign Office summarized the reports that had been received 
about the rernilitarization of the Rhineland since Francois-Poncet's 
' 
meeting with Hitler on November 21. There were also reports from the 
Swiss chief of staff which indicated that the reoccupation of the Rhine-
13 land might come as early as the .end of January. Brigadier General 
Georges Renondeau, the French military attache in Berlin, as well as 
Francois-Poncet, thought that the coup in the Rhineland would come by 
' 
10 Telegram, Corbin to Laval, London, January 10, 1936, .QQ£., 2nd 
Series, vol. I, Doc. No. 29, p. 40, 
11Dispatch, Corbin to Laval, London, January 10, 1936, ibid., Doc. 
No. 32, pp. 44-48. 
12 Telegram, Laval to Corbin, Paris, January 11, 1936, ibid., Doc. 
No. 36, p. 52. 
13 Telegram, Clauzel to Laval, Bern, January 10, 1936, ibid., Doc. 
No. 27, pp. 37-38. 
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surprise and perhaps when the Germans were giving the appearance of en-
gaging in conciliatory negotiations. It was probable, he said, that 
the Germans were waiting until the ratification of the Franco-Soviet 
Pact presented a usable pretext. In any case, the reoccupation of the 
Rhineland would not be deferred past the beginning of 1937. Even with-
out an overt violation of the Rhineland, there was every reason to be-
lieve that a camouflaged remilitarization would take place through the 
gradual infiltration of the police by military units. 14 Though General 
Renondeau believed that the German public campaigns against the demili-
tarized zone indicated that the Rhineland was marked for aggression, he 
thought that the issue was not yet settled in Berlin and that the 
Germans would wait until France was occupied with foreign and domestic 
distractions. The weakness of the French reaction to the violations 
already committed by Germany had doubtless given the impression that any 
15 
recriminations would be nothing more than verbal. 
In view of these warnings, the French Foreign Office attempted to 
begin its contingency planning by considering several difficult ques-
tions. Would it be imprudent to maintain contact with the British? 
There was a distinct danger that British involvement would cause vacil-
lation at the critical moment when the French government needed to act 
quickly. However, if the French government considered that the German 
action would be serious enough to justify precautionary military meas-
ures which might cause Berlin to reflect and facilitate negotiations, 
14Note for the Direction of Europe, Demilitarized Zone, Paris, 
January 11, 1936, ibid., Doc. No. 37, pp. 52-54. 
15Dispatch, Renondeau to Fabry, Berlin, January 15, 1936, ibid., 
Doc. No. 63, pp. 91-93. 
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it would be helpful to inform London. After the most recent campaign 
in the German press, would it be advisable for the French ambassador to 
give a precise warning to the Germans? Certainly, Francois-Poncet could , 
advise the Germans that their action would be denounced at Geneva, but 
if the French government decided to take military measures it would not 
be helpful to warn Berlin. 16 The answers to these questions were far 
from clear. 
The War Office proved as reluctant as the Foreign Office to reach 
a meaningful decision. The frequency of reports of an imminent German 
move in the Rhineland finally prodded Gamelin to write a statement sum-
marizing the potential threat for the January 18 meeting of the Supreme 
Military Committee. He estimated the total German military strength at 
790,000 troops, including the S.S., the Labor Service, and the milita-
. d l' 17 rize po ice. Gamelin calculated that Britain and Poland were the 
only powers that France could rely on to organize any resistance to 
Hitler, but he pointed out that the British could not give as much help 
to France on land as they had in 1914. The purpose of German military 
action in the Rhineland was to neutralize the French army by erecting 
fortifications along the border, thereby,rendering France incapable of 
intervening to defend the Little Entente. Despite the gravity of the 
situation, the Supreme Military Committee concluded its meeting with 
the decision merely to give further study to the eventuality of German 
16Note for the direction of political affairs, "Eventuality of a 
German initiative in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland", Paris, 
January 14, 1936, ibid., Doc. No. 53, pp. 78-79. 
17Note from the General Staff of the Army for the Supreme Military 
Committee, Paris, January 18, 1936, ibid., Doc. No. 82, pp. 116-120. 
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reoccupation of the Rhineland. 18 The military leaders of France agreed 
that the remilitarization of the Rhineland would be intolerable and 
would render their military planning useless, yet they did nothing more 
than mark time and engage in further studies. 
In the meantime, a new government came to power in France. How-
ever, it was no more prepared than its predecessor to take the decisive 
action necessary. The Laval government, which had survived a vote of 
confidence in December, was ended by the resignation of the Radical 
ministers on January 22. They were dissatisfied with Laval's devious-
ness and pro-Italian policies, and they demanded that the Franco-Soviet 
Pact, which Laval had delayed, be ratified. Only a caretaker government 
was thought to be needed to rule until the general elections in April. 
Unfortunately, the new government proved to be more concerned about the 
forthcoming elections than preparing to oppose Hitler in the Rhineland. 
Perhaps the new government was slightly to the right of center in 
18Report of the meeting of the Supreme Military Committee, Paris, 
January 18, 1936, ibid., Doc. No. 83, pp. 121-124. 
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political composition, but it lacked a firm ideological basis. 19 Albert 
Sarraut, who agreed to preside over the new government, was an experi-
enced politician but not a heroic leader. As a Left Democrat, he served 
in twenty-five ministries before World War II. He and his brother owned 
one of the most influencial Radical papers in France, .h!, Depeche of 
Toulouse. Probably, he was chosen as premier because he did not offend 
either the Right or the Left. In order to bring the support of conser-
vatives, Pierre-Etienne Flandin, a Left Republican, was chosen as 
Foreign Minister. He was rather tall for a Frenchman, and his character 
and appearance was often described as more British than French. He was 
regarded as pro-British in his approach to French foreign policy, and 
had many personal friend in London. Although very intelligent and sue-
cessful as a politician, he was a fatalist. Eden said that he .was "more 
given to mourn than to reproach," and this particular characteristic was 
certainly not suited to dealing with Hitler. One of the ministers most 
19The members of the government which took office on January 24, 
1936, were as follows: Ministers - Albert Sarraut (S*), Left Democrat, 
Premier and Interior; Yvon Delbos (D), Radical Socialist, Justice; Jo-
seph Paul-Boncour (S), Not registered, State, for the League of Nations; 
Pierre-Etienne Flandin (D), Left Republican, Foreign Affairs; Marcel 
Regnier (S), Left Democrat, Finance; General Joseph Maurin, War; 
Francois Pietri (D), Left Republican, Navy; Marcel Deat (D), Socialist 
UnioA, Air; Henri Guernut (D), Radical Socialist, National Education,; 
Camille Chautemps (S), Left Democrat, Public Transportation; Georges 
Bonnet (D), Radical Socialist, Commerce and Industry; Paul Thellier (D), 
Left Republican, Agriculture; Jacques Stern (D), Left Republican, Colo-
nies; L.-0. Frossard (D), Not registered, Public Works; Rene Besse (D), 
Left Independent, Pensions; Georges Mandel (D), Independent Group, Mail, 
Telegraph, and Telephone, and Alsace-Lorraine; Louis Nicolle (D), Repub-
lican and Socialist Party, Public Sanitation and Physical Education; 
Louis Chappedelaine (D), Left Radical, Mercant Marine. Under-Secretar-
ies of State - Jean Zay (D), Radical Socialist, State; Andre Beauguitte 
(D), Left Republican, Interior; Pierre Maze (D), Radical Socialist, Pub-
lic Transportation; Jules Julien (D), Radical Socialist, Education; 
Maxence Bibie (D), Socialist Union, Public Works. *s indicates member-
ship in the Senate; D indicates membership in the Chamber of Deputies. 
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committed to a firm policy against Germany was Georges Mandel, the Min-
ister of Communications. As a protege of Clemenceau, he was one of the 
most unyielding members of the government and provided the strength of 
character that seemed to be lacking in many of his colleagues. Joseph 
Paul-Boncour, the delegate to the League, began his career in government 
in 1899. As a scholar, he had written on a variety of subjects, in-
cluding politics, economics, art, and the theatre. He had left the 
Socialist Party in 1931, but he remained convinced that Germany had to 
be opposed and that the Rhineland crisis was the right time to stop 
Hitler. Marcel Deat, the Minister of Air, had earned a distinguished 
service record during World War I and was a college professor at Reims 
before being elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1926. During the 
Rhineland crisis, he did not want to fight unless France was invaded; 
he subsequently opposed declaring war when Poland was attacked and be-
came a Nazi collaborator in order to undermine the Vichy government. 
General Joseph Maurin, the Minister of War, advocated a defensive policy 
and opposed the creation of an armored force. Even after World War II, 
he remained phlegmatic and really never attempted to defend his conduct 
during the Rhineland crisis. Although the Sarraut government had come 
to power on a brief wave of hostility to Laval's appeasement of Italy, 
it lacked sufficient unity to carry through an unpopular decision that 
might have brought war. 
The funeral of King George V at the end of January, 1936, provided 
the opportunity for French officials to sound out the reaction of their 
British counterparts to the German threat in the Rhineland. The crucial 
issue in these discussions was the impression that Flandin conveyed. 
Were the British warned to expect that France would use force to 
40 
maintain the demilitarized zone? Flandin subsequently declared that he 
was certain.that the German government was planning to take military 
action in the Rhineland and that he was resolved to discover the inten-. 
tions of the British government in such a case. As he stated in his 
memoirs, 
I posed the question directly to the Prime Minister. He re-
plied with this counter-question: what has the French gov-
ernment decided to do? I could do nothing more than give my 
personal opinion: it will be resisted, I replied. But on my 
return to Paris, I added, I would demand that the government 
state its position, and I would relay it to M. Eden at our 
coming meeting at Geneva in February.20 
Eden's account of the conversation, on the other hand, reveals the 
British attitude in greater detail: 
I replied that the French attitude to a violation of the 
Rhineland was clearly a matter for the judgement of the 
French Government in the first instance. How much impor-
tance, I asked, did they attach to the demilitarized zone? 
Did they wish, for their part, to maintain it at all costs, 
or would the French Government prefer to bargain with the 
German Government while the existence of the zone still had 
value in German eyes? Flandin replied that these were just 
the subjects which he thought our Governments .should care-
fully consider and on which they should then consult. This 
was hardly the attitude.or language of a man determined to 
fight for the Rhineland. Flandin told me that he expected 
both the Chamber and Senate to ratify the Franco-Soviet Pact 
before the general election, which would take place at the 
end of April or the beginning of May. He thought that the 
present situation, in which the Pact was signed but unrati-
fied, was most unsatisfactory. Again he wanted to know 
whether I had any advice to give him. I replied that M. 
Flandin would know as well as I that the German Government 
had always shown resentment of the Pact, but it was scarcely 
possible for His Majesty's Government to advise the French 
Government on ratification, which was essentially a question 
of French policy. Flandin appeared to think that since 
Germany not only knew of the Pact's signature, but also seemed 
to expect its ratification, the event would not create any 
undue stir. • . . I thought it desirable that the French 
Government, as the power directly concerned, should make up 
their mind about the Rhineland. If they wished to negotiate 
2°Flandin, Politique franyaise, pp. 194-195. 
with Hitler, they should do so; if they intended to repel a 
Gennan invasion of the zone, they should lay their military 
plans. Any forcible action would depend on France,!whose 
large anny was still, on paper and in fact, far superior to 
that of Gennany in experience and equipment. From my talk 
with Flandin, I had the impression that, while not prepared 
to use force to defend the zone, he was equally reluctant to 
negotiate about it.21 
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Harold Macmillan also presents a very interesting account of Flandin's 
attitude toward the British: 
Flandin certainly talked very big, and declared with apparent 
sincerity that if England would give the lead, all Europe 
would follow. Now was the last chance. If Gennany was not 
stopped now, there would be no hope of holding her later. I 
was. impressed by the man and his large and powerful figure. 
But I do remember even then a feeling that there was some-
thing wrong about him. He protested too much. He even tried 
a degree of blackmail, for he argued that if England would 
not now come out and stop Germany, France would be forced to 
adopt a pro-German policy. . • . I have the feeling that 
Flandin was not unwilling to escape by putting the blame on 
us. At any rate there was no sign that the French would 
act,22 
Whatever attitude Flandin.~:.may have ·thought he conveyed to the British, 
they clearly did not gain the impression that there was any reason for 
them to worry that France would invade. the Rhineland in order to prevent 
German remilitarization. Indeed, the disparity between the British and 
French accounts clearly indicated the difficulties that were symptomatic 
of their relations. 
Upon returning to Paris, the Foreign Minister asked the Supreme 
Military Committee what military measures were possible for ilIDllediate 
21Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators (Boston, 1962), pp. 373-374. 
22Harold Macmillan, Winds.£.! Change, 1914-1939 (New York, 1966), 
p. 428. 
opposition to the reoccupation of the Rhineland. 23 According to 
Flandin's account, 24 Maurin, the Minister of War, explained that the 
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French Army was "entirely modelled to play a defensive role, and that, 
it had made no preparations and still less was it ready for a military 
intervention of the type which I was suggesting." When Flandin asked 
if it would be possible to blockade the German ports of Bremen and Ham-
burg in order to bring pressure on the Germans, Pietri, the Minister of 
the Navy, replied that it would be impossible without the cooperation 
of the British fleet. Deat, the Minister of the Air Force, put forward 
the view that aerial bombardment would constitute "an indisputable act 
of war, with all the risks to which civilians would be exposed." At 
this point, Flandin observed that 
I was all the more put out of countenance by the fact that I 
was counting on a quick reaction by our military men in the 
face of the threat which the reoccupation of the Rhineland by 
the German Army would constitute for French security; and, a 
fact unique, perhaps, in the history of France because the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was generally inclined to-
ward conciliatory negotiations, was assuming the character of 
a bellicose Minister in front of the Service Ministers, who 
were not thinking at all of fighting for the Rhineland. 
Gamelin intervened to say that since "the Anny General Staff was only 
an executive body, it was the duty of the Government to make a 
23 Under the Sarraut government, the members of the Supreme Military 
Committee were the Ministers of the three armed services and their 
Chiefs of the General Staffs. 
24Flandin, Politique francaise, pp. 195-196. There was no account 
of the meeting of the Supreme Military Committee to which Flandin re-
ferred in DDF. Gamelin, who was allegedly present, did not mention it 
in his memoirs. However, Paul Reynaud believed that the meeting did 
actually take place and that therefore, Gamelin' s "silence is all the 
more worthy of attention." (.!E_~ Thick of~ Fight, p. 121.) Since 
Flandin did not give the exact date, it is possible that he was refer-
ring to the cabinet meeting on February 27. Nevertheless, it can be 
verified that the attitude of the military was as Flandin characterized 
it later in February. 
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decision." Of course he was right; however, the military had the re-
sponsibility of giving information and advice to the government. Their 
timid response denied the civilian members of the government the support 
needed to inspire a firm response. Further, Flandin said that he re-
ported the meeting of the Supreme Military Committee to the Council of 
Ministers and that he was authorized to tell Eden that the French would 
place their military forces at the disposal of the League in order to 
oppose the violation of treaties. At Geneva, when Flandin told Eden of 
the French decision and asked for the assistance of the British govern-
ment, Eden replied that he would consult with his Cabinet and relay 
25' their answer through the usual channels. However, the response never 
26 
came. 
Unknown to the French, Eden had already decided on the British at-
titude. He was convinced that the French would not fight and were only 
looking for someone to blame for their inaction. Therefore, he wired 
George Clerk, the British ambassador in Paris, to warn him against dis-
cussing hypothettcal cases with Flandin. Clerk was instructed that 
since the demilitarized zone was designed for French and Belgian secu-
rity, it was for those two governments to decide how important it was 
to them. Eden's instructions continued: 
In the event of M. Flandin returning to the subject you 
should make it clear to him that, in the first instance, we 
expect to be told the views and intentions of his own govern-
ment, and you should not give him any encouragement to hope 
25There is some doubt about the date of .the meeting between Flandin 
and Eden at Geneva. Flandin's memoirs indicated that it was before the 
Franco-Soviet Treaty was ratified, but the only similar meeting Eden 
mentioned was on March 3, after the ratification of the Franco-Soviet 
Pact. 
26Flandin, Politique francaise, pp. 195-196. 
that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to discuss 
the matter on the basis of a statement of the British atti-
tude. 
Eden's reluctance to commit Britain to maintaining the status quo in 
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the Rhineland was not prompted by a lack of concern. He was fully aware 
of the significance of a possible German reoccupation. After calling 
for reports from the General Staff and the Air Staff, Eden explained in 
a note to the cabinet that 
... the disappearance of the demilitarized zone will not 
merely change local military values but is likely to lead to 
far-reaching political repercussions of a kind which will 
further weaken France's influence in Eastern and Central 
Europe, leaving a gap which may eventually be filled either 
by Germany or by Russia. 
Yet, aware as he was of the crucial significance of the Rhineland, he 
was not ready to commit Britain to the aid of France. "Taking one thing 
with another," Eden concluded, 
it seems undesirable to adopt an attitude where we would 
either have to fight for the zone or abandon it in the face 
of German reoccupation. It would be preferable for Great 
Britain and France to enter betimes into negotiations with' 
the German Government for the surrender on conditions of our 
rights in the zone while such surrender still has a bargain-
ing value. 27 
Unfortunately, the French were not informed that they could expect 
nothing from the British, nor did Eden take the initiative in opening 
negotiations with the German government. 
By the end of January, 1936, the French government was deluged 
with intelligence reports about German activities in the Rhineland. 
Jean Dobler, the French consul general in Cologne, complained that his 
warnings to the War Office had gone unheeded for the last three months 
of 1935. On January 31, he reported that German preparations for the 
27 Eden, Facing the Dictators, pp. 375-376. 
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remilitarization of the Rhineland were virtually complete. Yet 
throughout February, the Minister of War continued to display the timid-
ity that Flandin reported when he returned from the funeral of George V. 
On Feburary 12, Maurin wrote to Flandin that when the Rhineland was re-
occupied by the Germans, France should immediately complain to the 
League. As far as military plans were concerned, he recommended "pre-
cautionary measures" and suggested that the troops on the border be 
placed on alert. He said that the military preparations should be kept 
to a minimum in order to avoid the appearance of welcoming war. "To 
use our right to occupy the demilitarized zone would risk being against 
French interests," Maurin opined. "We would risk appearing as an ag-
gressor and thus find ourselves alone against Germany." He recommended 
that Britain be informed and drawn into the French plans along with the 
29 
other Locarno powers. 
It was Maurin's view that entering into negotiations with the 
Germans was dangerous and should be avoided. If it was impossible to 
avoid negotiating, the provisions of the Treaties of Versailles and 
Locarno which concerned the Rhineland had to be strictly maintained. 30 
Maurin did not explain how the demilitarization of the Rhineland could 
28Note from M. Dobler on the eventual military reoccupation of the 
Rhineland by German troops, Paris, February 1, 1936, DDF, 2nd Series, 
vol. I, Doc. No. 126, pp. 177-178. For some unexplained reason, 
Renond~au did not give his observations on the report until March 4. 
Dispatch, Renondeau to Maurin, Berlin, March 4, 1936, ibid., Doc. No. 
277, pp. 390-393. The text of Dobler's report is given in Dispatch, 
Dobler to Flandin, Paris, January 31, 1936, ibid., Doc. No. 277, Annex 
I, pp. 390-392. 
29Dispatch, Maurin to Flandin, Paris, February 12, 1936, ibid., 
Doc. No. 170, pp. 245-247. 
30Dispatch, Maurin to Flandin, Paris, February 17, 1936, ibid., 
Doc. No. 196, pp. 290-293. 
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be prevented if the French were going to wait for British help, and 
Flandin was extremely displeased with the War Minister's response. He 
even suspected at this point that perhaps the military might welcome 
the reoccupation of the Rhineland since it could be used to justify an 
increase in military spending. Although Flandin acknowledged that there 
was nothing in Maurin's reports to indicate specific measures which 
would intimidate Hitler or delay the remilitarization, French ambassa-
dors had already been instructed to inform their host governments that 
France would not accept the unilateral repudiation of treaties. At this 
time, it was the opinion of the Foreign Office that German violations 
must be reported to the League which would then decide if military ac-
tion was necessary. Flandin said only that France might not necessarily 
have the right to occupy the Rhineland as Maurin had said. 31 
In the meantime, the French Chamber of Deputies was continuing its 
debate on the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact. French opposition 
to the pact came mostly from the Right. They were concerned about the 
risks that the commitment might bring for France, the influence of the 
Third International within France, the effect on their chances for re-
election, and the dangers of further provoking Hitler. Philippe 
Henriot, a Radical and Jacques Doriot, a former Communist who later or-
ganized the Popular French Party, developed the argument that the alli-
ance was merely part of the Soviet scheme to draw France into a world 
31Department note, Demilitarized zone, "Observations on the letter 
from the War Office on February 17, 1936," Paris, February 24, 1936, 
ibid., Doc. No. 223, pp. 317-318; Telegram, Flandin to Ambassadors in 
Brussels, Rome, Warsaw, Washington, Prague, Belgrade, and Bucharest, 
Paris, ibid., Doc. No. 217, p. 313. 
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C . 1 . 32 ommunist revo ution. Xavier Vallat, a leader of the Republican Fed-
eration, minimized the assistance that France might expect from the 
Soviets owing to geography and the doubtful condition of the Soviet~, 
army. He said that the pact was useless and dangerous since it would 
give Hitler the impression that he was encircled and tempt him to remil-
itarize the Rhineland and take over Austria. 33 The opponents of the 
pact also emphasized that the French army was defensive in character 
and might not be capable of fulfilling the obligations it had in Eastern 
Europe. The Right was concerned about the threat of the Popular Front 
in the coming elections. It would be difficult for them to campaign 
against the Communist party after they had just proclaimed friendship 
for the Soviets. 
Although support for the Franco-Soviet Pact came mostly from Radi-
~ 
cal Socialists and Socialists such as Edouard Herriot and Paul-Boncour, 
several prominent conservative Left Democrats and Left Republicans such 
as Flandin, Mandel, Pietri, and Paul Reynaud also voted in favor of the 
alliance. Henri Torres, the Chamber reporter and a Left Independent, 
described the Franco-Soviet Pact as the logical conclusion of the course 
that French foreign policy had been following since World War I. He 
said that the attack in the German press against the Franco-Soviet 
Treaty was a bluff, since they were even saying that French talks with 
the British during January were in violation of the Locarno agreements. 
The truth was that Germany wanted to localize conflicts and thus 
32Philippe Henriot, February 18, 1936, Debats, 1936, pp. 459-462. 
33xavier Vallat, ibid., pp. 452-455. 
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undermine collective security. 34 Herriot emphatically denied that the 
Franco-Soviet Pact was in conflict with the Treaty of Locarno. He 
pointed out that the Germans had given tacit recognition to that fact, 
with certain reservations, in their note of May 25, 1935, offering their 
h h ld k h S . u . 35 assurances t at t ey wou not attac t e ov1et nion. The Germans 
replied to Herriot's speech the following day and reaffirmed their con-
tention that the Franco-Soviet Pact would constitute a flagrant viola-
tion of the Treaty of Locarno. 36 
Considering the indecision that had taken hold of the government, 
Flandin presented a remarkably strong defense of the Franco-Soviet Pact 
before the Chamber of Deputies. He argued that the treaty could not be 
criticized on the grounds that it did not follow the course which French 
foreign policy had taken for the past fifteen years, that it was con-
eluded to isolate Germany, or that it did not complement the League. 
Nevertheless, the French government was prepared to present the question 
of divergent interpretations to the Permanent Court of International 
J . 37 ust1ce. This off er represented a concession from the French, since 
they had previously insisted that there was no reason to consider the 
two pacts incompatible. 
At the height of the debate, Hitler attempted to influence the 
Deputies through an interview which he gave to Bertrand de Jouvenel, a 
reporter for Le Matin. The sensational interview was a masterpiece of 
34Henry Torres, February 11, 1936, ibid., pp. 349-354. 
35~ Edouard Herriot, February 20, 1936, ibid., pp. 494-499. 
36 DIA, 1936, p. 20. 
37Pierre-Etienne Flandin, February 25, 1936, Debats, 1936, pp. 578-
584. 
Hitlerian deviousness. "I wish to prove to my people," the Fuhrer 
declared, 
that the idea of hereditary enmity between France and Germany 
is an absurdity. The German people has understood this. 
When I wrote [Mein Kampf], I was in prison. It was 
the time when the French troops were occupying the Ruhr. It 
was at the moment of greatest tension between our two coun-
tries. . . . Yes we were enemies, and I stood for my coun-
try, as is fitting, against yours; just as I stood for my 
country for four and a half years in the trenches. I should 
despise myself if I were not first of all a German in the 
moment of conflict. But to-day there is no longer any cause 
for a conflict. 
49 
As a politician, he said he could best revise his book through foreign 
policy. A rapprochement between France and Germany would indeed be a 
correction that was worthy of being made. When Jouvenel asked about 
the effect of the Franco-Soviet Pact, Hitler began lecturing on the 
deplorable situation that would be created. "Do you realize in France 
what you are doing?" he asked. 
You are allowing yourselves to be caught in the diplomatic 
toils of a Power whose only aim is to stir up the great Euro-
pean peoples into a disorder from which it alone will bene-
fit. It should never be forgotten that Soviet Russia is a 
political factor which has at its disposal an explosive revo-
lutionary idea and gigantic armaments. As a German, it is my 
duty to take account of such a situation. Bolshevism has no 
prospect of infecting us, but there are other great nations 
which are less immune to the bacillus of Bolshevism than 
we.38 
Unfortunately for Hitler's plans, the French government had the publi-
cation of the article delayed until February 28, and his warning played 
no part in the debates in the Chamber. For on the previous day, the 
Franco-Soviet Pact had been ratified by a vote of 353 to 164, with 45 
50 
b . 39 a stentions. 
Regrettably, the General Staff did not show as much courage as the 
Deputies. In a secret note to the Foreign Office on February 25, they 
recommended that the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact be deferred, 
and rather than demanding some military preparation to counter Hitler's 
plans, they recommended the submission of the Rhineland question to The 
H d h C 'l f h L f N . 4o ague an t e ounci o t e eague o ations. 
Annoyed with the Army's suggestion, Sarraut finally called a cabi-
net meeting in order to give some direction to drifting French policy 
on February 27, the day the Franco-Soviet Pact was ratified, When the 
possibility of German troops entering the Rhineland was raised at the 
meeting, Maurin insisted that the organization of the army during peace-
time would only permit a strictly defensive disposition of troops. Any 
offensive operations would require calling up reserves and industrial 
mobilization. Gamelin agreed with his superior's evaluation of the 
peacetime potential of the French army: "Our forces on active duty in 
France," he admitted, "are not even equal to half of those at the dis-
41 posal of the Germans." After considering this military advice, the 
Council decided to inform the British and Belgian governments that 
France would not proceed with any action alone. In the case of a fla-
grant violation of the Rhineland, France planned to consult with the 
39Telegram, Fran~ois-Poncet to Flandin, Berlin, March 9, 1936, DDF, 
2nd Series, vol. I, Doc. No. 349, pp. 458-460. 
40Note relating to the Franco-Soviet Pact, February 25, 1936, ibid., 
Doc. No. 227, pp. 322-323; Gamelin, Servir, vol. II, pp. 198-199. Ac-
cording to the editors of DDF, it was not possible to determine the ori-
gin or the destination of the note; however, Gamelin indicated that the 
note was .drafted by the General Staff for the Foreign Office. 
41Gamelin, Servir, vol. II, p. 199. 
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Locarno powers and take preparatory military measures for collective 
action which would be determined by.the Council of the League and the 
Locarno powers. 42 Apparently 1 the French government did not intend to 
abandon completely the right to oc~upy the Rhineland 1 since that possi-
bility was later considered. Indicating that France would consult with 
the Locarno powers while preparing to take collective action was not 
the same as admitting that France did not have the right to take mili-
tary action 1 nor was France promising that military power would not be 
used. 
Nevertheless 1 this communication must have been welcomed by Eden 
when Flandin gave him a copy at Geneva on March 3. Flandin proposed 
that the British government agree to maintain the demilitarized zone in 
return for French support in strengthening the embargo against Italy. 
If Italy left the League and made an agreement with Germany 1 there would 
be serious consequences for France, and the French government wanted 
43 
assurances from Britain before making any decision about the embargo. 
Eden replied that he would present the French views to his cabinet and 
then respond. However, the British reply never came. Although the 
French had predicted the reoccupation of the Rhineland as early as the 
Stresa conference 1 Eden was not ove·rly concerned that France would use 
.c • h d"d k f F h · 44 
.LOrce 1 since e i not now o any renc preparations. 
While the French were faltering 1 the final orders for the 
42Note from the Cabinet of Ministers 1 Paris 1 February 27 1 1936 1 
DDF 1 2nd Series, vol. I 1 Doc. No. 241 1 p. 339. 
43Dispatch 1 Flandin to Corbin, Paris 1 March 5 1 1936 1 ibid. 1 Doc. 
No. 283 1 pp. 396-398. 
44Eden 1 Facing the Dictators, pp. 378-379 1 394; Flandin 1 Politique 
francaise, p. 196. 
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remilitarization of the Rhineland had been given on March 2, the same 
day that Francois-Poncet asked for an appointment with Hitler to discuss 
' 
the friendly overture which the Fuhrer had made in the interview with 
Jouvenel. The French ambassador found Hitler "nervous, lacking in self-
assurance, reserved, and using medicore arguments with a sort of impa-
tience and an odd flow of speech." Hitler, who was "visibly distrubed 
and embarassed by the visit," demanded "time for reflection" and insist-
45 
ed that the visit be kept secret. Although he later bragged, "I go 
my way with the assurance of a somnabulist, the way providence has sent 
me," his plans to occupy the Rhineland had been initated more than ten 
th b f th f . 1 d . 46 mon s e ore e 1na or er was given. 
On May 21, 1935, he had given assurances that the Treaties of 
Versailles and Locarno would be observed, yet he had already issued the 
first directive for the remilitarization of the Rhineland three weeks 
earlier on May 2. A memorandum from Colonel General Werner von 
Blomberg, the Reich War Minister, revealed that the occupation had been 
discussed at the last staff talks of the armed forces before the Franco-
Soviet Pact was concluded. In May, 1935, Blomberg had warned that the 
operation would proceed "without regard to the present inadequate state 
of our armaments." Further, he had ordered "strictest secrecy" so that 
the operation might be "executed by a surprise blow at lightning 
45Dispatch, Franyois-Poncet to Flandin, 
ibid., Doc. No. 272, pp. 381-385; Telegram, 
Berlin, March 2, 1936, ibid., Doc. No. 265, 
Poncet, ~Faithful Years, pp. 190-191. 
46London Times, March 16, 1936, p. 12. 
Berlin, March 3, 1936, 
Franyois-Poncet to Flandin, 
pp. 373-375; Francois-
' 
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speed." 
The plans for the reoccupation were again discussed at the tenth 
meeting of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense Council of June 
53 
26, 1935. Colonel Alfred Jodl, the Head of the Horne Defense Department, 
had listed the preparations which would be needed. He cautioned that 
in the demilitarized zone "the principle that 'concealment is more irn-
48 port ant than results' must be applied at present." Surely, there can 
be no doubt that by the early summer of 1935 the Germans had already 
decided to reoccupy the Rhineland. 
Still, Hitler had to wait for just the right moment. In February, 
1936, his views on the timing of the coup were the subject of an ex-
trernely interesting conversation with Ulrich von Hassell, the German 
ambassador in Rome. According to Hassell's memorandum, Hitler thought 
that from a military point of view the rernilitarization of the Rhineland 
was absolutely necessary. Hitler confided that 
Until now he had always envisaged the spring of 1937 as the 
right moment. Political developments, however, made one won-
der whether the psychological moment had not arrived now. 
Admittedly, the fact that we would be considerably stronger 
in 1937, was an argument for postponement •.•• At the mo-
ment, however, Russia was only intent on having peace in the 
West. England was in a bad state militarily, and much ham-
pered by other problems; France was distracted by internal 
politics. In both countries there was strong opposition to 
the Russian Pact, which was to our advantage. He did not 
think that such a step on Germany's part would be answered by 
military action - though perhaps by economic sanctions; but 
these had meanwhile become thoroughly unpopular amongst the 
followers, who served as whipping boys, of Great Powers. 
47Reich Minister of Defense to the Chief of Army High Command, 
Chief of Navy High Command, Reich Minister for Air, May 21, 1935, Nazi 
Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington, 1946), vol. VII, Doc. C-139-;----
PP· 951-952, (hereafter cited as NCA). 
48Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the Reich Defense Council, June 
26, 1935, ibid., Doc. EC-405, pp. 450-455. 
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Hitler summoned Hassell to Munich to discuss the possibility of per-
suading Mussolini to denounce the Locarno Pact, whereupon Germany would 
follow. In any case, Hitler said that Germany would renounce the Treaty 
of Locarno, but Italy could have the advantage of denouncing it first 
in order to avoid being placed "in an extremely difficult position. 1149 
Mussolini declined the opportunity, but he admitted that "for Italy, 
Stresa was finally dead." Hassell concluded that Italy would leave the 
League when the sanctions against it were strengthened and that Italy 
50 
would not participate in any action against Germany. At least Hitler 
could count on Italy not to interfere with his plans for the Rhineland; 
that was a great improvement from the opposition that Germany had faced 
the previous spring. 
According to the testimony of the German leaders who were tried by 
the Allies at Nuremberg after World War II, the decision to occupy the 
Rhineland was not only difficult for Hitler but also opposed by the mil-
itary. Paul Schmidt, who acted as an interpreter for Hitler, and 
Constantin von Neurath, the Foreign Minister, testified that in the 
Foreign Office and military circles there was "considerable fear" of 
retaliation, though, Neurath himself "felt confident that the Rhineland 
could be remilitarized without armed opposition from Britain and 
51 France." Opposition from the military continued even after the 
49Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy, February 14, 1936, Docu-
ments EE_ German Foreign Policy (Washington, 1949), Series C, vol:-YV', 
Doc. No. 564, pp. 1142-1144, (hereafter cited as DGFP). 
50Political Report from the Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Min-
istry, February 22, 1936, ibid,, Doc. No. 579, pp. 1172-1177. 
51schmidt testimony, March 26, 1946, Trial of the Major War Crimi-
~ Before the International Military Tribunal-CNuremberg, 1947-1949), 
vol. X, pp. 218-219, (hereafter cited as TMWC). 
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decision had been made. General Fritz von Manstein, the chief of the 
Operations Department in the army, testified that when Hitler gave the 
final order for the remilitarization, Blomberg and General Werner von 
Fritsch, the Commander in Chief of the Army, objected and warned Hitler 
"against such a one-sided solution." Later in a private conversation 
with Manstein, Hitler complained that Blomberg had suggested that the 
German troops in the Rhineland be withdrawn when France mobilized thir-
d . . . 52 teen l.Vl.Sl.ons. For Hitler, the lack of confidence shown by the mil-
itary leaders became a source of suspicion. In a conversation with 
Field Marshal Gert von Rundstedt in February, 1938, Hitler 
complained very bitterly about the supreme military leaders. 
He said that he alone had been the one who forced rearmament 
through. The supreme military leaders had always resisted 
and said it was going too fast. In the occupation of the 
Rhineland, he charged them with a certain cowardice when they 
asked for withdrawal of the troops behind the Rhineland since 
France was not adopting a threatening attitude.53 
Of all the defendants at Nuremberg, General Hermann Goering, the 
Air Minister, was the only one who still maintained that Germany was 
completely right in occupying the Rhineland, since France had changed 
the balance of Locarno. He argued that Germany as a sovereign state 
had the right to free itself from the dishonorable commitment not to 
t f h R . h 54 pro ect a part o t e eic • Yet, Hitler himself was far from confi-
dent that his enterprise, justified or not, would succeed. According 
to Schmidt's memoirs, 
More than once, even during the war, I heard Hitler say: 'The 
forty-eight hours after the march into the Rhineland were the 
52Manstein testimony, August 9, 1946, ibid., vol. XX, pp. 603-604. 
53Rundstedt testimony, August 12, 1946, ibid., vol. XXI, p. 22. 
54Goering testimony, March 14, 1946, ibid., vol. IX, p. 285. 
most nerve-racking in my life.' He always added: 'If the 
French had then marched into the Rhineland, we would have had 
to withdraw with our tails between our legs, for the military 
resources at our disposal would have been wholly inadequate 
for even a moderate resistance. 1 55 
Jodl described the mood in Berlin as "the uneasy feeling of a gambler 
whose entire fortune is at stake. 1156 
The final orders for the remilitarization of the Rhineland were 
issued on March 2: 
Re-forming his divisional staffs, the C-in-C of the Army is 
to move forward sections consisting mainly of the VI, IX, and 
V Army Corps into the demilitarized zone in such a way that 
they will be transferred to permanent garrisons on the Rhine 
and east of it. Apart from that, one Infantry Battalion 
shall be transferred to Aachen, one to Trier, and one to 
Saarbruecken. The Regional police Inspectors West, South 
West, and South will come entirely under the orders of the 
C-in-C of the Army for the purpose of incorporating them into 
the army. The Reich Air Minister and C-in-C of the Air Force 
will transfer one fighter squadron each to the area around 
Cologne and Coblenz, and sections of the AAA into or near 
such towns on the Lower and Middle Rhine where the most im-
portant Rhine bridges are.57 
Major General Wilhelm Keitel, the Chief of the Wehrmachtsamt in the 
Reich War Ministry, also approved "inconspicuous air reconnaissance" 
58 
and U-boat reconnaissance "out of sigh of land." 
Although Hitler had embarked upon his greatest gamble to date, 
56 
Britain and Belgium were still fairly confident that they would not be 
dragged into war by the crisis. Since the French had consulted Britain, 
55Paul Schmidt, Hitler's Interpreter (New York, 1951), p. 41. 
56Jodl testimony, June 4, 1946, ~' vol. XV, p. 351. 
57Blomberg to C-in-C of the Army, C-in-C of the Navy, and Air Min-
ister and C-in-C of the Air Force, NCA, vol. VI, Doc. C-459, pp. 974-
976. 
58Reich Minister of War and C-in-C of the Armed Forces to C-in-C of 
the Navy, March 6, 1936, ibid.• Doc. C-194, p. 1019. 
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they made a.mistake in not being much more insistent. As the delays 
caused by Britain actually developed, it became apparent that France 
could have handled the German coup much better alone. The situation 
between France and Britain was unfortunate for the French, since they 
had agreed to consult the British after the remilitarization of the 
Rhineland and the British had not agreed to maintain the demilitarized 
zone or to compensate for its loss to French security. Although the 
French government clearly had adequate time to decide exactly what 
should be done when German troops entered the Rhineland, it failed to 
come to a decision before the crisis actually developed. If Hitler had 
discovered that the French were prepared to counter his action, he would 
have delayed his plan. There is no evidence to indicate that he actual-
ly knew France would not fight; in fact, the testimony of everyone who 
saw him during the first week of March indicated that he was extremely 
worried. Though the French unquestionably knew that they would have to 
decide what to do when German troops entered the Rhineland, they refused 
to face the situation. If the French did not want to do anything more 
than appeal to the League of Nations, then that action should have been 
taken before Hitler made his announcement, since France had the right 
to complain if there was any military activity suspected.in the Rhine-
land. The French military had not informed the civilian members of the 
government that they required several days and mobilization to respond 
to the German army. Considering that the remilitarization of the 
Rhineland had clearly been foreseen, it was inexcusable that "In Paris, 
58 
the denunciation of Locarno and the entrance of troops into the demili-
tarized zone fell like a thunderbolt. 1159 
59Francois-Poncet, 'Ib.e Faithful Years, p. 194. 
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CHAPTER III 
ABOVE ALL, NOT WAR! 
At dawn on Saturday, March 7, the German army officially occupied 
the Rhineland for the first time since 1918. The first news of the 
move arrived in Paris at 9:45 A.M. in the form of a phone call from the 
French military attache in Berlin. He relayed the reports of three 
sources, the first two being police informants who warned of an imminent 
occupation on March 12 or April 1. The third, a correspondent for a 
Paris paper, reported that German troops were already entering the 
Rhineland, but there was no further information. 1 Thus, the first word 
of the remilitarization of the Rhineland arrived in Paris at least 
three hours after the movement of German troops had already begun and 
from a wholly unofficial source at that. 
The actual number of German troops which entered the Rhineland is 
difficult to establish since there were widely differing estimates. Al-
though it could only be established from published German documents that 
"sections consisting mainly of the VI, IX, and V Army Corps" and three 
other battalions were sent into the Rhineland, the actual strength of 
the German force probably approximated 30,000 troops. According to the 
Nuremberg testimony of Jodl, Neurath, and Manstein, the occupation was 
merely symbolic and consisted of only one division, with three 
1Note for the Chief of Staff of the Army, Berlin, March 7, 1936, 
DDF, 2nd Series, vol. I, Doc. No. 297, p. 409. 
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battalions crossing the Rhine. 2 Goering testified that the Luftwaffe 
entered only a few cities on the right bank of the Rhine and could not 
have participated in the occupation of the left bank since there were 
not adequate ground preparations. 3 
Publicly, Hitler tried to play down the German strength in the 
Rhineland in order not to alarm the people in France and Britain. How-
ever, for the information of foreign governments, every effort was made 
to exaggerate the actual number of Germans employed. Keitel directed 
that foreign military attaches be told that 
The Rhineland will be occupied in the course of March 7 and 8 
by nineteen battalions and thirteen artillery units from the 
centre of Germany. The operation will be completed on March 
8. The major part of the troops will be stationed on the 
Rhine and in the Rhine Valley between the Black Forest and 
the Rhine. Aachen, Trier, and Saarbrucken will have small 
garrisons. 
The Luftwaffe was to give the following response to the inquirires of 
the air attaches: 
On the Rhine two groups of fighter aircraft have arrived to-
day at their new peacetime stations at Cologne, Dusseldorf, 
Frankfurt on Main and Mannheim. Two anti-aircraft battalions 
will take up their permanent stations at Cologne and 
Mannheim.4 
Bernard von Buelow, the State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, was 
the first to ask the Luftwaffe, "What is the strength of a 'group'?" 
He was informed that in the case of the Rhineland occupation the two 
2Jodl testimony, June 4, 1946, TMWC, vol. XV, p. 352; Neurath tes-
timony, June 24, 1946, TMWC, vol. XVI, p. 625; Manstein testimony, 
August 9, 1946, ~' vol XX, p. 604. 
3Goering testimony, March 14, 1946, ibid., vol. IX, p. 285. 
4Reich War Minister and Conunander in Chief of the Wehrmacht to 
the Foreign Minister and the Reich Minister of Propaganda, March 7, 
1936, ~' Series C, vol. V, Doc. No. 23, pp. 44-45. 
groups consisted of twenty-seven fighter planes and about two hundred 
men with no reserves. 5 
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The German bluff was effective; French estimates of the number of 
Germans in the Rhineland continued to grow long after their peak had 
been reached. The first estimate from the French military attache was 
that 30,000 German troops, the equivalent of three divisions, had en-
tered the Rhineland. 6 On March 8, Flandin said French intelligence in-
dicated that German troops in the Rhineland had already doubled the 
number announced by Berlin. 7 On March 11, Gamelin reported that German 
strength in the Rhineland had reached a shocking total of 295,000 but 
admitted that only the 30,000 men in the .Wehrmacht had any real military 
value. His exaggerated figures included 30,000 from the Landespolizei 
(State Police), 30,000 from the Arbeitsdienst (Labor Service), 30,000 
from the~ (the motorcycle corps of the SA), 25,000 from the SS, and 
150,000 from the SA. Probably only the Wehrmacht constituted a real 
military threat, though it is possible that those members of the 
Landespolizei who had some military training could have offered some 
' 
effective resistance to the French. 8 
The formal announcement of the Rhineland coup was made simultane-
ously by Neurath in Berlin and the German ambassadors in European capi-
tals. The official memorandum released by the German government 
51bid., p. 45, fn. 2. 
6T~legram, Franrois-Poncet to Flandin, Berlin, March 7, 1936, DDF, 
2nd Series, vol. I, Doc. No. 300, pp. 412-413. 
7Telegram, Flandin to Corbin, Paris, March 8, 1936, ibid., Doc. 
No. 317, pp. 427-428. 
8Note for the Chief of Staff of the Army, Paris, March 11, 1936, 
ibid., Doc. No. 392, pp. 504-506. 
reiterated German objections to the F~anco-Soviet Pact and proclaimed 
that 
In the interest of a nation's primitive right to secure its 
frontiers and to ensure its possibilities of defense, the 
German Reich Government have therefore today restored the 
full and unrestricted sovereignty of Germany in the demili-
tarized zone of the Rhineland. 
The memorandum was concluded with proposals to serve as the basis for 
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new agreements and "establish beyond doubt the purely defensive charac-
ter of this action." The German government offered to negotiate with 
France and Belgium a new demilitarized zone on both sides of the border. 
It further offered nonaggression pacts with France, Belgium, and the 
countries in Eastern Europe. Finally, Germany was prepared to conclude 
air pacts with the Western powers and to return to the League of Na-
tions. 9 As Francois-Poncet observed, Hitler's tactics "all along the 
' 
line were the same he had employed previously with happy results. He 
struck his adversary in the face and as he did so declared: 'I bring 
10 you proposals for peace!"' The French ambassador protested the 
"forceful manner" of the German action and demanded to know how Germany 
intended to express its sovereignty. Neurath responded that Germany 
planned to send only small symbolic detachments and did not intend to 
establish fortified garrisons. 11 
At noon, Hitler followed with a speech to the Reichstag in which 
he announced that he had restored the "equal rights . . • and principles 
9Foreign Minister to the Missions in Great Britain, France, Italy, 
and Belgium, March 5, 1936, DGFP, Series C, vol. V, Doc. No. 3, pp. 
11-19. -
1°Fran~ois-Poncet, The Faithful Years, p. 193. 
11Telegram, Fran~ois-Poncet to Flandin, Berlin, March 7, 1936, .QQ!:._, 
2nd Series, vol. I, Doc. No. 298, pp. 410-411. 
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of honour" to Germany and that the German people would have the oppor-
tunity to ratify his foreign policy in a plebiscite on March 29. The 
one and one-half hour speech followed the long familiar formula in-
volving the injustice of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany's fundamental 
need for equality, the menace of Communism, and peaceful offers to 
France. 12 
By mid-morning, the dilatory French government was resigned to 
facing the German fait accompli. Hitler had taken the gamble; would 
France act in defense of its security? At ten o'clock, Sarraut called 
for a meeting at the Ministry of Interior. Mandel, the Minister of 
Communications, Paul-Boncour, the delegate to the League, and Gamelin, 
the Army Chief of Staff, were present for the entire meeting, and 
Flandin appeared briefly. According to Gamelin's recollections, Paul-
Boncour and Mandel were ready to reply by assembling the necessary mil-
itary means for imposing the will of France, the former going so far as 
to exclaim, "I would like to see you as soon as possible in Mainz." To 
this bold charge Gamelin replied, "Nothing would give me greater pleas-
ure, but you must give me the resources;" he requested authority only 
to take "preliminary measures of precaution," which involved deployment 
of the covering troops, recalling those on leave, and alerting the 
railroads. To Sarraut's query as to what would be the situation if 
France faced Germany alone without allies, Gamelin answered, 
In the beginning, in actual conditions, we would have the 
preponderance, but in a long war, the superiority of numbers 
and industrial possibilities would play forcefully for our 
adversaries .13 
12~, ~, pp. 35-41. 
13G l" S . 1 I I 201 ame in, ervir, vo • , p. . 
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Thus; the French government missed its earliest opportunity to call a 
full cabinet meeting and make a firm decision. The only result of the 
morning meeting was the initiation of preparatory measures for mobiliza-
tion and consultation with the other signatories of Locarno. Hitler's 
previously tested tactic of making announcements on Saturday had the de-
sired benefit of catching members of both the French and British govern-
ments away for the weekend. The French held their first official cabi-
net meeting on Sunday, and the British waited until Monday. 
Flandin spent Saturday afternoon in conferences with the ambassa-
dors of Britain, Belgium, and Italy, Of this meeting, Clerk, the Bri-
tish ambassador, reported to Eden that France did not wish to act alone, 
but wanted to bring the matter before the Council of the League with the 
other Local'Jlo powers. Clerk related that although the French had not 
made a definite decision, they were thinking of asking the League to 
condemn Germany's action "in terms like those used the previous April to 
condemn her rearmament. 1114 However, when Flandin wrote to the French 
ambassador in London, he maintained that he had taken a bolder stand and 
that Clerk had been told that "France could not accept any decision 
which in the first place practically called for the abandonment of the 
demilitarized zone of the Rhine. 1115 Flandin's reasoning appears par-
ticularly questionable at this point, for there was no reason to believe 
'· 
that a condemnation from the League would be any more effective than it 
had been the year before; it is difficult to imagine why Flandin thought 
that turning the League would preserve the demilitarized zone any more 
14Eden, Facing the Dictators, p. 386. 
15 Telegram, Flandin to Corbin, Paris, March 8, 1936, QQf_, 2nd 
Series, vol. I, Doc. No. 3l7, pp. 427-428. 
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than relying on the League earlier had saved the military restrictions 
of the Treaty of Versailles. 
The principal members of the Sarraut government and their military 
advisors met for the second time on March 7 at six P.M. The Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs, War, Navy, Air, and Communications and the Chiefs 
16 
of Staffs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were present. According 
to Gamelin's report there were "new theoretical discussions, but no one 
seemed oriented, at least i1ID11ediately, toward forceful solutions, . 
and for the moment, the decision about calling the reserves was not 
taken." Gamelin indicated that he sought the opinions of all factions 
"in order to best determine what measures should be employed to complete 
the preparations for mobilization. 1117 Since there was never any sugges-
tion Germany would cross the frontier, Gamelin's concern about preparing 
for mobilization might indicate that the government was closer to mili-
tary intervention than he willingly admitted. 
At eight P.M., Flandin released a statement which contained nothing 
of importance. The first few paragraphs were devoted to exposing the 
duplicity of Hitler in pretending to be interested in a Franco-German 
rapprochement while preparing for the remilitarization of the Rhineland. 
The French asked of what value were German grievances if they would not 
risk submitting them to arbitration. Calling for a meeting of the 
Council of the League of Nations was the only specific action announced. 
Though the memorandum did not completely reject the German offer for 
negotiations, Flandin pointed out that any reconciliation based upon 
16 ~Temps, March 9, 1936, p. 1. 
17Gamelin, Servir, vol. II, p. 202. 
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Germany's unilateral denunciation of freely concluded treaties would be 
. 11 . "bl 18 v1rtua y 1mposs1 e. 
The reaction of Great Britain was of crucial importance to the 
French. The first report from Corbin, the French ambassador in London, 
indicated the same sort of delaying tactic that had characterized the 
British attitude since the Stresa Conference. Eden thought that any 
action "leading to an irreparable engagement" should be postponed until 
the interested governments could consult together. He added that while 
Britain did not wish to hinder any measures which were judged necessary 
for French security, there could be no British decision until Monday. 
Corbin warned that there were elements in Hitler's proposals which were 
designed to seduce the British public and that there was no reason to 
follow a new mirage of negotiations which were preceded by a coup de 
main and the violation of treaties. 19 Furthermore, silence from the 
British government 11ould not help in directing public opinion toward 
resistance. 2° Corbin was instructed to insist that the signatories of 
21 Locarno meet in Paris by Monday. However, Eden delayed the meeting 
as long as he could in order to further postpone action and excused 
himself on the grounds that the British public would not favor a meeting 
in Paris before the League had an opportunity to meet, He refused to 
come on Monday because he had to appear in Parliament; Tuesday was the 
18 Le Temps, March 9, 1936, p. 1. 
19 Telegram, Corbin to Flandin, London, March 7, 1936, DDF, 2nd 
Series, vol. I, Doc. No. 301, pp. 413-414. 
20Telegram, Corbin to Flandin, London, March 7, 1936, ibid., Doc. 
No. 316, pp. 426-427. 
21Telegram, Corbin to Flandin, London, March 7, 1936, ibid., Doc. 
No. 317, pp. 427-428. 
first day he would come to Paris. Corbin thought that Eden wanted to 
plan the meeting so that he could spend the shortest time possible in 
Paris before leaving for Geneva. 22 
Belgium, the only Locarno power which was perhaps even more 
threatened than France, was also inclined toward League action. Al-
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though deeply disturbed, Paul van Zeeland, the Belgian Prime Minister, 
held the view that any serious military response would seem dispropor-
tionate in comparison to the reports of the small German forces in~ 
volved. According to his interpretation, the remilitarization of the 
Rhineland did not constitute the "assembling of forces" which made im-
d . . 23 me 1ate action necessary •. 
Thus, neither Britain nor Belgium gave the support that the falter-
ing French government wanted. Yet the Rhineland had always been essen-
tially a French concern, and the decision to take military action alone 
against Germany could have best been made by the French alone on March 
8, As time passed, France became more deeply committed to the British 
desire to avoid a confrontation. Since the German government had proud-
ly announced the restoration of sovereignty in the Rhineland, waiting 
for the League to certify that a violation had occurred was superfluous 
and wasted valuable time. Yet the French government continued to 
hesitate. 
At eight A.M. on March 8, Gamelin received the Minister of War in 
his office. Maurin thought that it would be necessary at the very least 
22Telegram, Corbin to Flandin, London, March 8, 1936, ibid., Doc. 
No. 322, pp. 431-432. 
23 Telegram, LaRoche to Flandin, Brussels, March 7, 1936, ibid., 
Doc. No. 302, pp. 414-415. 
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to recall the last contingent of soldiers that had been discharged, and 
authorized Gamelin to begin assembling troops already on active duty 
for railroad movement to the frontier. Since Gamelin's presence was 
not needed for the Council meeting that day, he spent the morning in 
24 
conference with his staff and other military leaders. 
The main topic of their discussions was war with Germany. Gamelin 
opined that the land front would stabilize quickly, and then the Air 
Force would provide the only effective offense against Germany. Georges 
Durand-Viel, the Chief of Staff of the Navy, cautioned that after 
Germany was declared the aggressor by the League, the government would 
ask if the military was prepared to drive the Germans out, and they 
needed to have their answers and requirements ready. Gamelin was con-
vinced that French intervention would mean war and that France could 
not enter the Rhineland without the other Locarno powers. Durand-Viel 
objected that England would not actually go to war for France and that 
there could not be any thought of coordinated action until the Italo-
Ethiopian conflict was liquidated. Gamelin insisted that it would be 
necessary to send a general to Geneva where the technical questions of 
France's rights under the Treaty of Locarno would be discussed. He 
thought that it was necessary to "verify that British and Italian troops 
will come immediately into France and that we ourselves can go into 
Belgium." General Maurice Pujo of the Air Force suggested that it was 
more realistic to expect bombers rather than troops from Britain or 
25 
or even Italy. The military leaders were continuing plans for 
24Gamelin, Servir, vol. II, p. 202. 
25Report from Abrail, Paris, March 8, 1936, QQ.E., 2nd Series, vol. 
I, Doc. No. 334, pp. 444-446. 
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mobilization and an invasion of Germany with the supposition that they 
could wait until there was foreign assistance. Their expectation of 
foreign intervention was completely unrealistic, and their insistence 
on British help and total mobilization were key factors in causing the 
French government to hesitate and falter. 
Meanwhile, the Council of Ministers convened its first official 
meeting after the German coup at 10 A.M. on March 8. Paul-Boncour, 
Flandin, and Zay are responsible for the only first-hand accounts of 
this important conference. Although their recollections varied, there 
is a general consensus that the meeting was the turning point in the 
decision to take the violation before the League and subsequently not 
to act against the Germans. The Foreign Minister was most critical of 
the lack of preparation, learning to his "profound amagement, that all 
that had been done was to move the troops which were to guard the Magi-
not Line into position and to send two divisions which had been sta-
tioned in the Rhone back to the Eastern border." He explained to the 
Counci 1 that he had informed the Secretary General of the League, "with-
out losing one hour," that France wanted the Council to meet as soon as. 
possible. He commented that informing the League was "unfortunately" 
an obligation that the British government thought was essential under 
the Treaty of Locarno. 26 For military intervention, Flandin thought 
that it would be necessary "to put a force of corresponding m.unbers in 
the field in order to go against Germany, . . • . certainly not more than 
50,000." However, Maurin pointed out that for military intervention in 
26However, the French documents revealed that Flandin waited until 
6:15 P.M. on March 8 to notify the League. Telegram, Flandin to 
Avenol, Paris, March 8, 1936, ibid., Doc. No. 321, pp. 430-431. 
70 
the Rhineland the General Staff required general mobilization. Yet, 
according to Flandin, Maurin never demanded total mobilization. Flandin 
was convinced that mobilization was rejected because certain of his col-
leagues "were more concerned with elections than foreign policy. • . . 
In politics on the eve of an election, who wished to be the party of 
war." In retrospect, Flandin maintained that Sarraut, Mandel, Paul-
Boncour, and himself were the only ones who favored immediate military 
action. "The Council advised waiting for domestic and foreign reactions 
b f ak . d . . .. 27 e ore t 1ng a ec1s1on. 
On the other hand, the account by Paul-Boncour, who represented 
France at the League, paints Flandin as far more conciliatory and less. 
resolute. According to his testimony, it was Paul-Boncour himself who 
urged bold action, declaring that France did not need to consult anyone 
"--not our Allies, not the League of Nations; we should have acted 
first." He concluded that "if total mobilization seemed necessary to 
the general staff and to the Minister of War, they had not foreseen 
anything else." Flandin presented his case for mobilization as if "his 
arm was in a sling after a serious accident," and ended with "I see, 
Monsieur President, that I must not insist." Paul-Boncour stated that 
M. Sarraut, M. Mandel, M. Flandin, and I declared very 
clearly as partisans of military action; two other of our 
colleagues, MM. Guernut and Stern, approved of us; and the 
others testified by their declarations, by their reserva-
tions, or by their silence that they would be hostile, or 
that they saw grave inconveniences.28 
Zay generally agrees with Paul-Boncour that Flandin was far from 
27Flandin, Politique francaise, pp. 198-199. 
28 Joseph Paul-Boncour, Entre deux guerres (New York, 1946), vol. 
III, pp. 30-36. 
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the champion of resolute action. Flandin, writes the Under-Secretary, 
detailed all the possible action, from the most energetic to 
the most theoretical, from mobilization and entry into the 
Rhineland to a mere diplomatic protest by appealing to the 
League of Nations, without himself making any choice from 
among them. 
Then, there was "a surprised silence," and the Service Ministers were 
asked their opinion. Maurin answered "in a stifled voice: 'The Foreign 
Minister talks of mobilization, of entering the Rhine. There are risks 
attached to this •.• , The present state of the French Army will not 
allow us to run risks, 1 " When asked about the reaction of foreign 
countries, Flandin "stressed the reserve of Britain and of Belgium, who 
were ready to collaborate with us in diplomatic action, but would not in 
any case agree to send their troops to support our own in an entry into 
the Rhineland." Zay testified that only Sarraut, Guernut, Deblos, and 
M d 1 II k . f f . . ,,29 an e spo e in avor o energetic action. 
Not withstanding the discrepancies in the three accounts of the 
March 8 cabinet meeting, it remains clear that Flandin was remiss in 
presenting the case for intervention. If the military required total 
mobilization and eight days to respond to the remilitarization of the 
Rhineland, it should have been made clear before March 8 to the other 
members, who were apparently surprised at the military unpreparedness. 
It was impossible to imagine why France, whose army had the best repu-
tation in Europe, needed eight days to do anything, while Germany, whose 
army was in a period of reorganization, could remilitarize the Rhineland 
in two days. For some reason which has not been revealed in the docu-
ments thus far published, French military intelligence had greatly 
29 Jean Zay, Souvenirs et Solitude (Paris, 1945), pp. 65-67. 
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overestimated the response that was required. Probably a small French 
force that could have occupied the bridges on the Rhine or an expedition 
into the Saar would have caused the Germans to retreat. 
After the Council meeting, an official communication was released. 
It stated briefly that Flandin had presented the latest intelligence, 
that the Council had judged the German memorandum to be unacceptable, 
and that a decision to submit the issue to the League and to consult 
with the other signatories of Locarno had been reached. The Minister 
of War announced that troop movements were confined to the frontier and 
that there was not yet any question of involving troops in the interior, 
indicating publicly that a decision to act against Germany had not been 
reached. It was also announced that the Navy and Air Force were pre-
. 11 1 h · 11 30 paring measures comp ementary to t e circumstances. 
The government's activities were completed on March 8 with a radio 
speech by Sarraut. According to Flandin, who wrote the speech, the 
purpose was "to galvanize French opinion and to impress foreign opin-
ion." He thought that Sarraut approved the bellicose tone because "he 
sincerely wanted to find in the French people the resonance which would 
permit him to engage our military forces, that is to risk war. 1131 The 
first part of the speech indicated the reasonable and conciliatory posi-
tion that France had taken toward Germany. However, when Sarraut came 
to the German memorandum of March 7, the tone of the speech changed to 
defiance. 
It is true that, in the document submitted yesterday to the 
French ambassador, the German government proposed, having 
30 Le Temps,.March 9, 1936, ,p ... 8 •. 
31Flandin, Politique francaise, p. 201, 
violated their engagements, to contract anew. I will not ex-
amine their proposition for two reasons. First, because in a 
double example during the space of the last year, the German 
government, having given us the unilateral repudiation of 
solemn engagements, will not give us confidence in its new 
position. The second reason is still clearer: in defiance 
of the most certain rights, the German government has sent 
considerable forces into the demilitarized zone, and without 
having previously indicated its intention to rid itself of 
its obligations, without even having looked into entering ne-
gotiations on the subject. • . • There can be no more peace 
in Europe, there can be no more international relations if 
this method is generalized. • • • Speaking in the name of 
the French government, I declare that we intend to see this 
essential guarantee of French security maintained. • . • We 
are not disposed to leave Strasbourg placed under the fire of 
German cannons.32 
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Despite these defiant words, the French public did not rally to support 
any sort of action against Germany. 
Even before Sarraut's speech, most editors remained calm, and no 
one unequivocally demanded military intervention. A survey of the opin-
ion of the French press in Le Temps on March 8 gave little encouragement 
to those who wanted support for military action. Most papers observed 
objectively that the remilitarization was certainly a test of collective 
security and that economic sanctions or general mobilization could be 
invoked. Right wing editors .made a point of not emphasizing the threat 
to France. Le Matin, a paper of the extreme Right, suggested that 
Hitler, in reoccupying the Rhineland, had shown France the "communist 
peril." Georges Bidault, in L'Aube, applauded Hitler for offering "a 
new Locarno." In L'Echo de Paris, Pertinax, a major spokesman for anti-
appeasement sentiment in France, merely called for economic sanctions 
. H" 1 33 against 1t er. 
32 Le Temps, March 10, 1936, p. 1. 
3311L'Opinion de la presse fran~aise," ibid., March 10, 1936, p. 2. 
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Following Sarraut's speech there was little change in the opinions 
expressed in French papers. In fact, he was criticized by the Right. 
Franyois le Grix, in L'Ami du peuple, was alarmed by Sarraut's refusal 
to consider negotiations. He favored abandoning the treaty with the 
Soviets and opposed any sort of sanctions against Germany since it 
would lead to war. In another Rightist paper, Le Jour, Leon Bailby 
warned that "the government when it speaks wil 1 do well to weigh its 
words." He also thought that economic sanctions would lead to war and 
that France would be alone even if the League decided to apply sanc-
tions. Charles Maurras, in L'Action Francaise, observed that "We do 
not have to march against Hitler with the Soviets. We do not have to 
march with Hitler against the Soviets." His message was clear; France 
did not have to fight. 34 
On the other hand, the Left, which had favored cooperation with 
the Soviet Union and the League, did not offer much support to the gov-
ernment either. In Le Populaire, the most important Socialist paper, 
Oreste Rosenfeld blamed the weak posture taken by the League during the 
Italo-Ethiopian conflict for encouraging Hitler to act. He thought that 
it was unrealistic to believe that Germany would accept the demilitari-
zation seventeen years after the end of the war. On March 12, Leon 
Blum, the chief spokesman of the Socialists and the future leader of 
the Popular Front, called upon the Socialist Party to set an example of 
"composure (sang-froid), calmness, firmness, and reason. 1135 
The papers published in areas that had the most to fear from 
341bid., March 10, 1936, p. 2. 
35Quoted in Joel Colton, Leon Blum (New York, 1966), p. 122. 
Germany were no more encouraging to the government than the Paris 
dailies. The editors of Le Journal ~Alsace ~de Lorraine thought 
that Sarraut's speech would not help the negotiations since "this was 
not the hour for recriminations, but for retrospective and platonic 
considerations." Jean Knittel wrote in Les Dernieres nouvelles de 
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Strasbourg that "For us, the only choice which has any importance is to 
conserve the peace and to take measures in case the Fuhrer or his sue-
cessors consider, on some fine day, that only war can safeguard the hon-
36 
or of Germany." 
The Rhineland crisis came at a time when the foreign policies of 
the French political parties were in a rather confused state. The Right 
had always been greatly concerned with French security and prestige, 
but their fear of Communism and an election victory by the Popular Front 
caused the Right to acquiesce to a serious threat to French security. 
The Left, which had supported sanctions against Italy, did not want to 
ruin their chances of being elected by becoming involved in a war with 
Germany. After World War II, Sarraut said that "no one wanted even the 
appearance of a dangerous foreign adventure. 1137 Certainly, Maurras ex-
pressed the desire of many Frenchmen when he wrote that "There is only 
one public counsel to give the government of the Republic: Above all, 
not war! 1138 
In spite of the lack of resolution in Paris, Eden was still worried 
2. 
3611L'Opinion de la presse franraise," Le Temps, March 10, 1936, p. 
37s 1 • d · Ed d B f H. t · d 1 arraut s testimony quote in ouar onne ous, is oire ...!..~ 
troisieme republique (Paris, 1962), vol. V, p. 454. 
38 Charles Micaud, The French Right and~ Germany (Durham, N.C., 
1943), po 92, 
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that the French might take some drastic action. He gave his opinions 
in a note drafted for the Cabinet on M~rch 7. He was certain that mil-
itary action by France against Germany should be discouraged. It might 
be possible for the Locarno powers to call upon Hitler to evacuate the 
zone; however, this course should not be taken unless they were prepared 
to back their request with military force. He feared that the French 
public, if further irritated or frightened, might demand armed retalia-
tion such as the reoccupation of the Saar. He calmly explained that 
"the reoccupation of the Rhineland had deprived us of a useful bargain-
ing counter." Now it was clear that Hitler would repudiate any treaty 
"when it becomes inconvenient, and when Germany is sufficiently strong 
and the circumstances are otherwise favourable for doing so." As for 
tactics, he thought that Britain must agree to a formal condemnation of 
Germany by the League but resist any attempt to apply financial and 
. . 39 
economic sanctions. 
The first official statement from the British government was given 
by Eden in Commons on March 9. He emphasized that the .Council of the 
League of Nations was the proper body to discuss the situation. The 
German offer for new negotiations was not completely rejected. Eden 
pointed out that 
The abrogation of the Locarno Treaty and the occupation of 
the demilitarized zone have profoundly shaken confidence in 
any engagement into which the Government of Germany may in 
future enter. • • • One of the main foundations of the pact 
of Western Europe has been cut away, and if peace is to be 
secured there is a manifest duty to rebuild. It is in that 
spirit that we must approach the new proposals of the German 
Chancellor. 
He was thankful to be able to say that there was "no reason to suppose 
39Eden, Facing~ Dictators, pp. 387-388. 
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that the present German action implies a threat of hostilities." How-
ever, if there was an actual attack on France or Belgium, the British 
"not withstanding the Gennan repudiation of the Treaty, would regard 
themselves as in honour bound to come in the manner provided in the 
Treaty to the assistance of the country attacked. 1140 
Finally, on March 10, the representatives of the four Locarno 
powers met in Paris to decide what they wanted to do in response to the 
German coup. Great Britain was represented by Eden, Lord Halifax, and 
Clerk; France by Flandin and Paul-Boncour; and Belgium by Van Zeeland. 
The Italian ambassador in Paris came as an observer, since Italy was 
still under League sanctions. Flandin opened the meet:lng with a force-
ful exposition of the French right to self-determination. He did not 
ask for the immediate assistance of Britain or Italy since "France was 
sure, with only its forces, to compe 1 the Gennan army to evacuate the .,,.,,.. 
territory which it had occupied in violation of treaties." He still 
maintained that the actions of Germany were "flagrant" and that the 
right to France to act was "incontestable." However, France, out of 
respect for British opinion, had already asked for a meeting of the 
Council of the League so that action could be taken with the shortest 
possible delay. He infonned the conference that "At the same time, 
France has taken and is taking military measures preparing for the in-
tervention which is thought to be indispensable." He clearly outlined 
the consequences that the fortification of the .Rhineland would have if 
Gennany remained unchecked. France would no longer be able to honor 
the obligations which it had contracted in the Covenant of the League 
40 Anthony Eden, March 9, 1936, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th 
Series, vol. CCCIX, col. 1806-1817. 
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in regard to Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. In the future, France 
would be deprived of .all possibility of .exercising military pressure 
against Germany, and it would no longer be in a position to execute a 
mission of assistance in the case of unprovoked aggression. Not only 
the future security of France but also the territorial status quo of 
Europe was at stake. According to Flandin, France did not want to fail 
to meet the responsibility for European peace which it had accepted, 
"it was just that in taking these responsibilities, we benefited from 
the moral support of the powers guaranteeing the Treaty of Locarno. 1141 
After Flandin's opening statement, Eden said that the Council of 
the League had to make all the decisions. Their meeting could only 
present the opportunity for a preliminary exchange of opinions. He 
commented that Flandin's statement was based on the "ill-founded" as-
sumption that the League Council would endorse whatever decision the 
Locarno powers made. He thought that only the Locarno powers, not the 
other members of the League, could possibly have any responsibility to 
assist in military action. When asked whether the French government 
contemplated the Locarno Powers taking action by themselves, Flandin 
answered that it did, and then he prescribed a "successive series of 
sanctions, economic, financial, and military," Eden thought that the . 
discussion was becoming more serious and he sought to determine French 
and Belgian intentions through a series of questions. When asked what 
Germany's attitude would be to the sanctions, both the Belgian and· 
French Foreign Ministers said they were confident that Germany would 
yield. Flandin.even added that the Italians could be persuaded to join 
41Flandin, Politique francaise, pp. 202-203. 
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if the sanctions against them were lifted. Halifax and Eden said that 
they did not think that economic and financial sanctions would be effec-
tive. Whereupon, "the French Ministers did not dissent, adding that it 
would be no use entering on this course unless we were ready to see it 
through to a successful end." When the British expressed surprise that 
the French public was ready to support military action, Flandin claimed 
that "even the most pacifist sections realized that everything was at 
stake. 1142 
When Van Zeeland presented his prepared statement, he emphasized 
that Belgium would take any action that Britain and France joined. He 
supported the British in asking that France not "indulge in an isolated 
action." He did not share the French view that Germany had to evacuate 
the Rhineland before any negotiations could begin. Flandin still argued 
that "negotiations would end in nothing, or rather it would sanction a 
new abandonment; and this time, the abandonment would be decisive be-
cause it would generate a series of other abandonments. ,,43 
The meeting ended without any substantial accomplishment. In re-
fleeting on the meeting, Eden admitted that the gravity of Flandin's 
statements exceeded anything that had been said before, yet he thought 
that the French were really looking for someone else to take the re-
sponsibility, "as the man who declares to spectators his intention of 
throwing himself over the cliff, hopefully glances at his coat-tails 
meanwhile. 1144 
42Eden, Facing the Dictators, pp. 390-393. 
43Flandin, Politique francaise, p. 204. 
44Eden, Facing the Dictators, pp. 393-395. 
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The French lack of success in getting support against Germany was 
further confirmed in the communique issued by the Locarno powers after 
their meeting. It was announced that there would not be any resolutions 
or decisions made prior to the meeting of the Council of the League. 
The talks were suspended with the announcement that they would be con-
tinued in London on March 12 and that the League would meet there on 
March 14. 45 
In the afternoon, a statement of the government was read by Sarraut 
in the Chamber of Deputies and by Flandin in the Senate. Considerable 
attention was given to showing that the German coup was illegal, intol-
erable, and a threat to peace and collective security. However, since 
March 8 the government had retreated from Sarraut's refusal to negoti~ 
ate. On March 10, the French government announced that it did not 
reject negotiations which could consolidate the future peace 
and ameliorate Franco-German relations in the framework of a 
tranquil and peaceful Europe; but France cannot negotiate un-
der the mastery of violence and the repudiation of signatures 
freely exchanged. . . . It remains ready to negotiate with 
Germany once the respect of international law has been newly 
assured. 
In presenting the course for future action, the French practically gave 
up the right to independent action. 
We are placing all our material and moral forces at the dis-
posal of the League of Nations in order to avoid this irrepa-
rable disaster for European civilization, under the sole con-
dition that we be accompanied in this fight for peace by 
those who are formally engaged by the Rhineland Pact and with 
the firm hope that all the signatories of the Covenant . . • 
would fight for the ideal to which they have declared their 
solidarity.46 
After the government's statement, it was difficult to imagine that the 
45 Le Temps, March 11, 1936, p. 8; March 12, 1936, p. 1. 
46Albert Sarraut, March 10, 1936, Debats, 1936, pp. 854-856. 
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French were still seriously entertaining any thought of moving alone 
against Germany. 
Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the session in the Chamber of 
Deputies, Flandin asked Maurin to make a study "on the eventuality of 
taking pledges" in regard to the seizure of Sarrebruck and Kehl. 
Gamelin reported that his staff favored invading the Saar, but they 
47 
were convinced that at least partial mobilization would be necessary. 
In the evening, Sarraut called what he described as "a secret 
Council of War. 1148 The Service Ministers--Maurin, Deat, and Pietri--and 
their Chiefs of Staff--Gamelin, Pujo, and Durand-Viel--were invited "to 
decide the question of a military reply from France" and told to bring 
all the charts and plans that could be used. Sarraut was convinced that 
neither the British nor the Belgians would march, but he wanted to try 
one last time to see if there was the means of acting against Germany 
without total mobilization. Again, Maurin and Gamelin agreed that the 
elements of the French army on active duty could only take defensive 
action. 49 If the Germans resisted, Gamelin pointed out that the diffi-
culties of taking a modern urban conglomerate were equal to attacking 
military fortifications. He suggested that the best route for an 
47Gamelin, Servir, vol. II, p. 204. 
48rhere is some doubt about the date on which this meeting was held. 
In his post-war testimony, Sarraut was certain that it was held on March 
9, but he also said that he called the meeting after he "no longer had 
any illusions about the evasive attitude of the cosignatories of 
Locarno." This would seem to indicate that the date was March 10 as 
given by Gamelin. Neither account gave any information about what at-
titude France should take when the Locarno powers met. This also would 
seem to indicate that the time was the evening of March 10 after the 
Locarno powers had met. 
49 Quoted in Bonnefous, Histoire de la troisieme republique, vol. V, 
pp. 454-455. 
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offensive action would be through Belgium--a plan which would certainly 
cause further delay and was not likely to have the support of the Bel-
gian government. The representatives of the other armed services also 
emphasized the difficulties and the seriousness of France acting alone. 
If an invasion of Germany were attempted, Pujo and Durand-Viel added 
that the Air Force and Navy would also require total mobilization. Deat 
said, "We are prepared for war, but with the League of Nations." Pietri 
added, "It is necessary in every way to show that we have the right and 
that we do not appear as aggressors." In justifying the cautious stand 
taken by the military, Gamelin subsequently explained that "If we showed 
the obstacles to be overcome, it was not to discourage the taking of 
energetic resolutions, but in order to reveal what was called for. 1150 
Sarraut testified that it was after the declarations of the military 
that the decision "of acting not alone, but in accord with the cosigna-
tories of Locarno" was taken. Three conclusions were then clear to him. 
The first is the recognition that our soldiers on active duty 
could not stand against the very superior strength of the 
Germans. . . . The second is that our General Staff, even 
though alterted for a long time, was afflicted with anchy~ 
losis in the routines of the defensive, and did not dare to 
conceive or prepare , .. the effective instrument of im-
mediate reply to Hitler's aggression. . . And the third 
recognition, which became a precedent, is that our high mil-
itary authorities, incapable of offensive movement or too 
timid to risk it, were already oriented toward a very simple, 
very serious, I was going to say, a lazy solution ... ,51 
After the meeting, Sarraut instructed Gamelin to draw up a note 
which summarized their conclusions. His note concerning operations 
against Germany was finished on March 11 and submitted to Sarraut by 
50Gamelin, Servir, vol. II, pp. 204-208. 
51 Quoted in Bonnefous, Histoire de .!.!_ troisieme republique, vol. 
V, p. 455. 
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Maurin. His first conclusion was the key to Germany's success; he 
thought that it was evident that all operations against Germany must be 
done with the League and Locarno powers in order not to give the impres-
sion of aggression by France. The easiest and safest operations were 
thought to be through the Saar or along the Moselle River, but these 
could only be initiated eight days after the decision was made. The 
German response to an invasion of the Rhineland could be an attack on 
Belgium, an aerial action against Paris, an attack by submarines, or 
simply the bombardment of French cities on the Rhine. Gamelin said that 
Maurin was convinced after his talk with Sarraut that the measures fore-
seen in the note would be taken, yet the decision never came. 52 
Consequently, by March 10, France had all but irretrievably lost 
the opportunity of forcing the German army from the Rhineland. There 
was never an actual decision to concede to the Germans, although the 
French arrived at the same position by default. Much of the responsi-
bility for France's inaction must be assigned to the military. Gamelin 
protested that he and Maurin never demanded total mobilization and that 
they, therefore, should not be blamed for discouraging the government. 
However, since 1919, the French army had been led in accordance with 
the supposition that there would be nothing less than total war in 
Europe, and ,the French military did not seem to have anything to offer 
without total mobilization. Given the serious consequences of the re-
militarization of the Rhineland, the military could be more easily ab-
solved from blame if they had demanded total mobilization. Even though 
there had been considerable warning, the military did not inform the 
52Gamelin, Servir, vol. II, pp. 208-209. 
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government that they would require eight days and total mobilization to 
reply to the Germans. Simple lack of preparation and poor communica-
tions within the government must be considered as a factor contributing 
to French hesitation and inaction. 
Furthermore, the lack of zeal on the part of the military leaders 
and their insistence that total mobilization was required for any of-
fensive action had a depressing effect on the civilian members of the 
government. Still, there was some merit in Gamelin's assertion that 
the decision was for the government and not its soldiers to make. The 
French were further stymied by the legal safeguards they had constructed 
for themselves. There was no real reason to wait for the Council of the 
League of Nations to certify that a violation of the demilitarized zone 
had been committed, but the British could not be persuaded that there 
was a flagrant violation which required immediate action. While the 
British attitude was of primary importance in the considerations of the 
French government, the demilitarized zone existed because of French, not 
British, insistence; it was unrealistic to expect the British to involve 
themselves as deeply as the French. Although the Sarraut government had 
come to power during a brief flurry of anti-appeasement, the French 
people were truly not prepared to accept the inevitability of war with 
Germany. It was not surprising that politicians facing election were 
overly concerned about catering to public sentiment. That civilian 
members of the government were not prepared to ignore the advice of the 
military, the wishes of Belgium and Britain, and the will of the people 
was understandable, albeit, under the circumstances, unfortunate. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE MASK OF PEACE 
When the meeting of the Locarno powers in Paris failed to reach 
any decision to act against Germany, it was all but inevitable that the 
Rhineland crisis would become nothing more than a series of pointless 
negotiations. Despite the legal correctness of the French position, 
Hitler was determined not to let the meetings of the Locarno powers and 
the Council of the League of Nations deprive the German point of view 
of publicity. On March 10, he granted an interview to Ward Price, a 
correspondent for the Daily~· He was mainly concerned with ampli-
fying his peace proposals and covered many of the points that had been 
raised in his speech to the Reichstag on March 7. Britain was invited 
to come forward as the "honest broker" to aid in the solution of the 
problems between France and Germany. When questioned about the size of 
the forces in the Rhineland, Hitler interjected that "there can be no 
question of the concentration of armed forces for offensive purposes be-
cause Germany has no further claims to make from France." In regard to 
world public opinion, Hitler predicted that "the verdict of posterity 
. will not contest that it was more honourable and right to make an 
end of a state of tension which had become intolerable 
Perhaps taking the request for an honest broker seriously, Eden 
1 DIA, .!2.~£_, pp. 57-61. 
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sent for the German ambassador, Leopold von Hoesch, after the British 
Cabinet meeting on March 11. As a contribution to European peace, Eden 
asked that Germany withdraw all but a symbolic number of troops and 
agree not to build any fortifications while negotiations were in prog-
ress. The German reply, which Eden did not think was a "sufficient con-
tribution," merely offered not to increase the number of German troops 
along the border on the condition that France and Belgium do the same. 
The issue of fortifications was not mentioned, but the German government 
refused to "enter into a discussion with regard to a lasting or provi-
sional limitation of the German sovereignty in the Rhineland territo-
2 
ry." It was clear that Hitler was feeling less uneasy about his gamble 
and not much inclined to make concessions to the faltering Locarno 
powers as they met in London. 
Going to London was a diplomatic setback for the French and, recog-
nizing it as such, Flandin complained that "we found ourselves in a sit-
uation specifically hostile to our views." According to the observa-
tions of the French Foreign Minister, the British people were "literally 
enraptured" by the peace incentives Hitler had calculated for them and 
"France was treated as the habitual troublemaker for true peace. 113 
Although Flandin was still trying to find some way to get the Germans 
out of the Rhineland, the London milieu had its effect on him also. 
Upon arriving, he told Winston Churchill that he intended to demand the 
mobilization of all British forces and that he had the support of all 
the nations in the Little Entente and other states. According to 
2Eden, Facing the Dictators, pp. 397-399; London Times, March 13, 
1936, p. 13. 
3Flandin, Politique francaise, p. 205. 
Churchill, Flandin spoke valiantly: 
The whole world and especially the small nations today turn 
their eyes towards England. If England will lead now, she 
can lead Europe. . . . It is your last chance. . . . France 
cannot guarantee Czechoslovakia any more because that will 
become geographically impossible. If you do not maintain the 
Treaty of Locarno, all that will remain to you is to await a 
rearmament by Germany, against which France can do nothing. 
If you do not stop Germany by force today, war is inevitable, 
even if you make a temporary friendship with Germany. As for 
myself, I do not believe that friendship is possible between 
France and Germany; the two countries will always be in ten-
sion. Nevertheless, if you abandon Locarno, I shall change 
my policy, for there will be nothing else to do.4 
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In spite of Flandin's warning, the British did not rally to the support 
of France. 
During the afternoon and evening of March 12, the Foreign Ministers 
of the Locarno powers met to determine what views they would present to 
the Council of the League. Flandin had been instructed to demonstrate 
the consequences that weakness would have on other western nations. 
Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia supported France; but 
if Hitler was successful, they would alter their foreign policies ac-
cordingly. Anxiety was high in Austria, where the French ambassador 
had been told, "The next time, it will be our turn." Likewise, the 
Scandinavian countries, especially Denmark, were uneasy. According to 
the note drafted by the French Foreign Office, "The question this moment 
is whether Europe will be German or not. 115 Eden confessed to being 
surprised at the strength of the opening French statement. It seemed 
that Flandin specifically wanted to avoid the ambiguity and uncertainty 
4Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. I, The Gathering 
Storm (London, 1948), p. T§S. 
5Note for the Minister, Paris, March 12, 1936, DDF, 2nd Series, 
vol. I, Doc. No. 407, p. 525. 
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that had made the Locarno agreements vulnerable to Hitler's action; 
therefore, he recommended that the Council of the League persuade 
Germany to withdraw its troops from the Rhineland while negotiations 
were in progress. Flandin wanted it known from the beginning that the 
new negotiations must end in a treaty with guarantees much more auto-
matic than those in the Locarno Pact. As Eden understood Flandin's 
presentation, the French might recognize the right of Germany to have 
troops in the Rhineland at a later date, but they were not willing to 
negotiate toward accepting German fortifications. Eden thought that 
the French statement could lead to an agreement, and Van Zeeland took 
the responsibility of drafting a resolution which could be discussed. 6 
At the end of the meeting, the Locarno powers issued a communique which 
recognized that the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone by Germany 
constituted a clear violation of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of 
7 Versailles and of the Treaty of Locarno. 
On Friday, the representatives of the Locarno powers met twice. 
Apparently, Flandin was considering a retreat from the strong stand he 
had taken, since he telephoned Paris to ask what requests France should 
make if negotiations were started without the evacuation of the Rhine-
8 land. However, by the time Van Zeeland presented his memorandum, 
Paul-Boncour, the French representative to the League, had arrived and 
did not seem pleased. In fact, he was staggered by how far the discus-
sions had strayed from French public opinion, which he interpreted as 
6 Eden, Facing the Dictators, pp. 399-400. 
7 London Times, March 13, 1936, p. 14. 
8 Report on the Meeting in the Office of General Georges, Paris, 
March 13, 1936, DDF, 2nd Series, vol. I, Doc. No. 425, pp. 549-552. 
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9 
requiring the complete withdrawal of German forces. Eden argued that 
it would not be sensible to sacrifice lives to accomplish this, if 
France was planning to accept the principle of negotiating for the with-
drawal of German forces and then allowing the return of full sovereign-
ty. Again, Flandin presented the argument that economic and financial 
sanctions might still be effective, but the British would not agree. 
Finally, Flandin remarked that he must at least have some new guarantees 
so that he could have something to present to the French public. 10 Al-
though the Locarno powers continued meeting, their failure to reach a 
definite decision before the Council of the League began meeting was 
another diplomatic setback for the French. 
When the Council of the League finally met on March 14, the first 
day was spent in discussing the admission of a German representative 
and in hearing statements from the French and Belgian delegates. 
Flandin's statement emphasized that the French had the right "to take 
strong and decisive measures forthwith," but they had refrained in order 
not to further disturb the European situation. France was resolved to 
commit all its forces, "both material and moral, to help •.. overcome 
one of the most serious crisis in the history of peace and of its col-
lective organization." He repeated that France was willing to let the 
Permanent Court at The Hague decide if the Treaty of Locarno and the 
9on March 12, Le Temps had featured a categorical denial that 
France would accept the limitation of the number of German troops in the 
Rhineland and no fortifications as a solution to the crisis. Le Temps, 
March 12, 1936, p. 1. 
lOEden, Facing the Dictators, pp. 400-401. The memoirs of Flandin 
and Paul-Boncour give very few details of the meetings between the 
Locarno powers in London. Therefore, it is necessary to rely almost 
entirely upon a British account. 
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Franco-Soviet Pact were in conflict. He appeared to be still consider-
ing some sort of military action against Gemany when he stressed that 
the authors of the Treaty of Versailles had not intended to make 
any difference between an attack on national territory and a 
deliberate and large-scale violation of the zone. In asking 
that the violation should be recognized, the French govern-
ment simply asks that the law should be applied. Once this 
has been done, it will be for the guarantors to furnish 
France and Belgium with the assistance provided for in the 
Treaty, 11 
Van Zeeland agreed with Flandin's statement, but he confined his 
remarks specifically to the problems which conerned Belgium. He deliv-
ered an eloquent plea in behalf of the small nation which was not di-
rectly concerned with the Franco-Soviet Pact. 
You will realize that anxiety is being experienced by no 
country more acutely than by Belgium. No country is more af-
fected by Germany's action than Belgium .... The demili-
tarization of the Rhineland constituted one of the essential 
elements of the system for our security, for, in proportion 
to the forces of the various countries, Belgium has the 
longest and most exposed common frontier with Germany. 
For Belgium, the Locarno Pact still existed. Van Zeeland maintained 
that "The purpose of pacts of this kind is precisely to protect those 
of its signatories which remain faithful against those which may be 
unfaithful. 1112 
After the meeting of the League Council, the ministers of the 
Locarno powers met briefly at the Foreign Office. Flandin reported 
that the French government could not agree to begin discussions on Van 
Zeeland's memorandum because it seemed to indicate the acceptance of 
German troops in the Rhineland and negotiation without some sort of 
11oIA, ~' pp. 82-85. 
12Ibid., pp. 85-87. 
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compensation. 13 Apparently, Flandin did not present the full text of 
his government's reply to his question about what supplementary guaran-
tees France would require if negotiations were begun without the full 
evacuation of the Rhineland. He was told that France must have the com-
mitment of the total means of the Locarno powers for land, air, and 
naval action at its disposal and British and Italian detachments in 
France and Belgium as a supplementary guarantee "in order to materialize 
their solidarity and their will for cooperation. 1114 Although Flandin 
ultimately was able to obtain acquiescence from Britain and Italy for 
an international force to occupy a part of the Rhineland within Germany, 
he merely said at this time that France rejected Van Zeeland's proposals 
and that he would prepare a paper which showed French requirements for 
security. Therefore, Eden's charge that Flandin had fallen into a con-
fusing policy of saying one thing when speaking to the Locarno powers 
' . 
1 
and quite another when speaking to his own government does seem to have 
l "d" 15 some va i ity. 
While the Locarno powers were trying to decide what could be done 
about the German coup, Hitler started campaigning on March 12 at 
Karlsruhe in the Rhineland, where he told an enthusiastic audience that 
"nothing will induce us to renounce this regained sovereignty over the 
Rhineland zone. 1116 His second campaign speech in Munich on March 15 
13 Eden, Facing ~Dictators, p. 401; London Times, March 16, 1936, 
p. 12. 
14 Report on the Meeting in the Office of General Georges, Paris, 
March 13, 1936, DDF, 2nd Series, vol. I, pp. 449-452. 
15 Eden, Facing ~Dictators, pp. 401-404. 
16London Times, March 13, 1936, p. 14. 
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dealt even more incisively with foreign affairs and the remilitarization 
of the Rhineland. He could not pass up the opportunity to flaunt his 
refusal to make some concession, as Eden had requested: 
Many people come to me now and say, 'Herr Hitler, why do you 
not make a gesture?' They talk of gestures! But I have done 
something which is worth a thousand gestures. I have put 
forward a scheme which will ensure the peace of Europe for 
the next twenty-five years, by giving security to France, 
Belgium, and Holland. We will not suffer Germany to be all 
the time hauled before international Courts, particularly 
when we are definitely in the right.17 
Although Hitler had never shown any particular interest in present-
ing his case to an international tribunal, the question of the partici-
pation of the German government in the discussions of the Council had 
arisen as early as March 9. At that time, the Secretary General had 
sent a copy of the French request for a meeting of the Council to the 
German government and added that he wanted to be told if the German gov-
ernment wished to participate. In a secret meeting on March 14, the 
Council decided to invite Germany to take part in the discussions. 
France, according to Flandin, demanded the "immediate verification of 
the violation" and then would not oppose hearing from Germany. In his 
opinion, inviting Germany was merely a means of gaining time, an inte-
18 gral part of Britain's plan. On March 15, the German government re-
plied that it was prepared to accept the invitation of the Council only 
if assured that the German representative would participate on equal 
terms with the members of the League and that negotiations on the German 
proposals would begin "forthwith." The Council replied that Germany 
could participate on the same terms as Belgium and France, but it could 
17Ibid., March 16, 1936, p. 12. 
18Flandin, Politique francaise, pp. 205-206. 
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. b f . . 19 not give any assurances a out uture negotiations. 
While waiting for the issue of German participation to be decided, 
the French and Belgian governments presented a resolution which asked 
the Council to find that Germany had committed a breach of the Treaties 
of Versailles and Locarno and to instruct the Secretary-General to noti-
20 fy the signatory powers of this finding without delay. 
The discussion of this draft resolution began on March 17 and con-
sisted only of statements which agreed that the violation existed and 
that all nations must be concerned about developing a new basis for in-
ternational confidence and security, In speaking for Russia, Maxim 
Litvinov gave the strongest criticism of Germany that was heard during 
the debate on the Franco-Belgian resolution. Not only did he reject 
Hitler's reasons for the remilitarization of the Rhineland, but he also 
completely rejected the sincerity of the German peace proposals. He 
condemned the offer of nonaggression pacts as an attempt at "the local-
ization of war." To Litvinov, the German memorandum of March 7 repre-
sented "a new attempt to divide Europe into two or more parts, with the 
object of guaranteeing nonaggression for one part of Europe in order to 
acquire a free hand in dealing with other parts." In conclusion, 
Litvinov indicated that his government was ready to take part in all 
measures proposed to the Council by the Locarno powers. 21 The Chilean 
representative announced that unless the Council asked the Permanent 
1911Extraordinary Session of the Council, Denunciation by Germany of 
the Locarno Treaty," ~ Monthly Summary. of the League of Nations 
(Geneva, 1936), vol. XVI, no. 3 (March, 1936), p. 77. 
20London Times, March 17, 1936, p. 16. 
21 Ibid., March 18, 1936, p. 9. 
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Court for an advisory opinion before taking a vote, he would abstain. 22 
On March 18, the representatives of Britain, Italy, Poland, Spain, 
Argentina, Denmark, Romania, and Portugal spoke. For the French, Eden's 
statement was probably the most important and the most disappointing; 
his emphasis on conciliation certainly was in contrast to Litvinov's 
speech. While characterizing the .remilitarization of the Rhineland as 
"a patent and incontestable breach of the provisions of the Treaty of 
Versai Iles," he stressed that recreating international confidence was 
really the object of the Council, Rather than asking that action be 
taken against Germany which would restore Hitler's respect for collec-
ti ve security, he said that "international confidence can only be re-
stored if each nation that has the power to do so will make a construe-
tive contribution to this end." Eden found two advantages in the situa-
tion. The first was that immediate action was not necessary: "We hap-
pily have time in which to endow our action with the prudence, as well 
as the determination, which the situation requires." Secondly, the 
situation brought an opportunity to "reconstruct international life on 
the basis of undertakings above the signatures of those assuming 
th ,,23 em. 
As the power which shared with Britain the responsibility for guar-
anteeing the Treaty of Locarno, Italy was still under League sanctions 
for its invasion of Ethiopia and not especially concerned about being 
cooperative. Although Dino Grandi, the Italian ambassador in Britain, 
affirmed his country's obligations under the Treaty of Locarno, he drew 
22 Ibid. 
23Ibid., March 19, 1936, p. 16. 
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the attention of the Council to the "contradiction which exists between 
the position of a country subjected to sanctions and the duties of a 
24 guarantor Power." Italy was still participating in the discussions 
which the Locarno powers were holding while the Council was meeting, but 
Grandi assumed the role of an observer, rather than actually joining in 
the efforts to find a new settlement for European security. 
While the discussion of the Franco-Belgian resolution was underway 
in the Council, Germany agreed to accept the invitation to give its 
views to the Council on an equal basis with the nations which were mem-
bers. Accordingly, Joachim von Ribbentrop was sent as a special emis-
sary from Hitler to lead the German delegation to the Council. Although 
Flandin had wanted the vote of the Council to be taken before hearing 
from Germany, Ribbentrop spoke on the morning of March 19 and the vote 
was taken in the afternoon. The German statement followed the same 
lines that Hitler had taken on March 7, citing the many peace proposals 
and sacrifices that had been made by Germany and stressing Germany's 
willingness to conclude a lasting settlement. 25 
When the vote on the Franco-Belgian resolution was taken, thirteen 
nations voted for the resolution, Chile abstained, Ecuador was absent, 
and Germany voted against the resolution. Thus, the Council had ful-
filled its responsibility for judging Germany's action, but Hitler had 
never been impressed by League resolutions. Ribbentrop offered a formal 
protest which assured the Council that their decision would not be 
24Ibid. 
25 Ibid., March 20, 1936, p. 9. 
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ratified by history. 26 
Meanwhile, the parallel discussions that the Locarno powers had 
been conducting were completed later the same evening. Since none of 
the participants wrote a detailed account, it is impossible to trace 
their daily progress. However, both Flandin and Eden have left their 
general impressions and descriptions of some specific incidents. As 
the French Foreign Minister recalled, he lost "any illusions" about the 
attitude of the British government at the time of a private conversation 
"th th P . M" . 27 wi e rime inister. Although Stanley Baldwin explained that he 
understood little of foreign affairs, he believed that he could inter-
pret the feelings of the British people and they wanted peace. Flandin 
responded that 
France is not trying to draw Great Britain into war. She 
would assume, alone, all the charges and all the risks of the 
operation which would be no more than a simple police opera-
tion. And, having been informed in the interval, that the 
German troops had received orders to retreat if they came 
against French resistance . . . all that we ask is that we 
have freedom. 
Despite the truth of Flandin's argument, Baldwin still insisted that if 
there was even one chance in a hundred that war would follow from the 
French police action, he did not have the right to commit the British 
28 
who were "not in a state for going to war." Flandin concluded that 
26 Ibid., p. 14. 
27The date of this conversation is unclear. It could have been 
after a dinner that Baldwin gave on March 14. There could be some 
reason to doubt Flandin's word in this case because Baldwin surely 
would have told Eden who does not mention it in his account. 
28Eden partially verified this point by reporting that the govern-
ment had been informed by the Chiefs of Staff on March 12 that if there 
was any risk of war, total mobilization would be necessary and that all 
forces would have to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean. Eden, Facing 
~Dictators, p. 400. 
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if he persisted, there would be a break between France and Great 
Britain, and he decided that a defensive alliance would be better since 
the Treaty of Locarno would probably be lost in the commotion resulting 
from a police action. Therefore, he was determined not to be "contented 
with a vague, imprecise guarantee, subject to the delays of the League 
of Nations." His refusal to compromise on the question of military 
agreements, according to Flandin, led to his threatening to leave for 
Paris several times, but he finally got the military commitment that he 
wanted from Britain. 29 
Eden's report of Flandin's behavior in London is somewhat differ-
ent. Citing Flandin's duplicity on several occasions, he complained 
that the French Foreign Minister had adopted the policy of agreeing in 
private with one British delegate, then taking the opposite view in a 
conference, For example, Flandin was said to have admitted in a private 
conversation with Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
that he recognized that Britain could not agree to sanctions against 
Germany. Then, two days later on March 18, he asked for sanctions 
against Germany and argued that France could not continue sanctions 
against Italy unless they were also applied to Germany. At this time, 
the British replied that the League did not have the responsibility of 
enforcing sanctions against Germany. When Flandin insisted that he was 
thinking of an economic sanction, such as refusing to allow 
German ships in the ports of Locarno powers, Eden countered that the 
text of the French proposals went far beyond financial sanctions. 30 
29Flandin, Politique francaise, pp. 207-208. 
30Eden, Facing ~Dictators, p. 400. 
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There is clearly a question of the vigor that Flandin used in at-
tempting to get British approval of a police action against Germany. 
From Eden's admission, it appeared that Flandin did at least try, though 
perhaps not consistently. Churchill, who was not a member of the gov-
ernment at this time, but saw Flandin frequently, thought that the honor 
and bravery shown by the French Foreign Minister during the anxious week 
he spent in London more than compensated for his "subsequent lapses. 1131 
Although Flandin certainly shared the responsibility for the initial 
hesitation of the French government, after that mistake had been made 
he probably did as well as anyone could have in London. 
The product of Flandin's efforts was a series of proposals which 
Eden submitted to the League in behalf of the Locarno powers and draft 
letters from Britain and Italy to France and Belgium. Although it was 
not even certain that the proposals would be approved by the four re-
maining Locarno governments, much less Germany, Flandin claimed that he 
could return to France with an accomplishment that was worthy of 
honor. 32 
The proposals from the Locarno governments indicated that they 
agreed that nothing had changed their commitment to the Treaty of 
Locarno. Germany was asked not to increase the number of troops, to 
suspend fortificatons, to allow an international force to patrol a 
twenty-kilometer zone, and to submit the dispute to The Hague. If 
Germany accepted these restrictions, the Locarno powers were willing to 
discuss the twenty-five year nonaggression pacts proposed by Germany 
31churchill, The Second World~' vol. I, pp. 197-198. 
32Flandin, Politique francaise, p. 210. 
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and the revision of the status quo in the Rhineland. During the nego-
tiations, the powers agreed to insist that fortifications be limited or 
prohibited in a zone which would be determined within Germany. They 
were also prepared to hold an international conference to discuss eco-
nomic relations, arms limitation, German reentry into the League, and 
nonaggression pacts for Germany's eastern neighbors. Furthermore, in 
order to reaffirm their "scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations," 
they planned to instruct their General Staffs to begin "arranging the 
technical conditions in which the obligations which are binding upon 
them should be carried out in the case of an unprovoked aggression." 
From all the proposals made by the Locarno powers, these General Staff 
conversations were clearly the most important issue in France, Belgium, 
B . . d G 33 rita1n, an ermany. 
In addition to these proposals, the Locarno powers had also at-
tached two annexes to the draft agreement. A resolution proposed by 
the Locarno powers for the approval of the League Council asked that 
the proposals be recognized by the Council and enlisted its aid in ac-
complishing the recommendations that had been made. The second annex 
was a proposed letter from Britain and Italy which gave several assur-
ances to France and Belgium if the proposed negotiations failed. The 
most important assurances were the promise to take "all practical meas-
ures available for the purpose of ensuring the security" of France 
and Belgium "against unprovoked aggression" and the continuation of 
contact between their General Staffs. 34 The governments of Britain, 
33 The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, vol. XVI, no. 3, 
pp. 93-94. 
34Ibid., pp. 94-95. 
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France, and Belgium approved the entire set of proposals almost immedi-
ately, but the Italian government did nothing. 
The failure of Italy to support these proposals had a very depres-
sing effect on the Council of the League, which had adjourned after re-
ceiving the report from Ede~. When the Council reconvened on March 24, 
it was obvious that Italy was planning to withhold its approval. In ad-
dition, Colonel Jozef Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, argued against 
such universal proposals from a limited group of European powers and 
reserved the opinion of his government. Facing these difficulties, the 
Council passed a resolution which thanked Eden for his communication of 
the proposals and declared that "any further action , . . should remain 
in abeyance for the present, in view of the conversations which are 
being carried on." The adoption of this resolution ended participation 
by the League and left the Locarno powers to find the best settlement 
they could. 35 
On March 20, Eden, Flandin, and Van Zeeland gave a report on their 
negotiations to their respective legislatures. In order to allay fears 
that Britain was too deeply committed to the defense of France, Eden 
explained that Britain was only 
... joining in a reaffirmation of our Locarno obligations 
and . . . arranging for contacts between the General Staffs 
of the guarantor Powers and those of France and Belgium. I 
need hardly say that the sole object of these conversations 
would be to meet the possibility of any unprovoked aggres-
sion. 
The main objective of the British government had been "to restore confi-
dence in international law and create conditions in which an effort may 
35Ibid., p. 82; Le Temps, March 25, 1936, p. 1; March 26, 1936, 
p. 1. 
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be made to rebuild European stability," and for that purpose, it had 
been necessary "to bridge the gap in time which will . . • enable nego-
tiations for the re-establishment of a system of security in Europe to 
be effectually undertaken and carried to a conclusion." If the proposed 
negotiations failed, Eden said that Britain and Italy would address let-
ters to France and Belgium "indicating what their position in that event 
would be." Since Eden's statement was made on the motion for adjourn-
36 
ment, no debate followed. 
In spite of Eden's assurances to the contrary, British commitments 
sounded more serious when they were reviewed in Brussels and Paris. Van 
Zeeland observed that it was the first time in history that the British 
government had said what it would do in the case of certain hypothetical 
situation before that situation was realized. Although he admitted that 
France and Belgium had made serious concessions for this commitment, he 
hoped that their proposals would be successful and that when the status 
of the Rhineland was revised, German troops would be withdrawn complete-
ly. If Germany refused to begin negotiations, he still hoped that Bel-
gium would be in a more secure position, since the support of Britain 
and France had been reinforced. 37 
After voting in favor of the Franco-Belgian resolution in the 
League, Flandin had flown back to Paris on March 19 so that he could 
present his report before Eden released the results of their discussions 
to the League. The Council of Ministers met from nine to eleven-thirty 
and then released a statement which said that they approved "the account 
36Anthony Eden, March 20, 1936, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 
5th Series, vol. CCCX, col. 842-850. 
37London Times, March 20, 1936, p. 11. 
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f h 1 f h . . 1138 o t e resu ts o t e negotiations. Although Eden, worried about 
public reaction, had asked Flandin not to insist on the agreement with 
Britain, the French Foreign Minister tried to make this commitment sound 
as important as their military alliance before World War I. 39 
On the next day, Flandin explained the government's reasons for 
accepting the proposals of March 19. Although the restoration of the 
demilitarization of the Rhineland was preferable, that could have been 
realized only if the Locarno powers could have agreed to apply suffi-
cient pressure on Berlin, and he was soon convinced that such an agree-
ment could not be reached. To those who thought that the results of 
the negotiations were insufficient, Flandin said that the enforcement 
of economic sanctions instead of the use of military power would have 
been very difficult for an already vulnerable economy and would not have 
had the agreement of Britain and Belgium, If France had insisted on 
military action or economic sanctions, the support of the other Locarno 
powers would have been lost. "Therefore, we preferred to support a sys-
tern of moderate propositions; an invitation was made to Germany: if she 
accepts, it will open , .. new perspectives for the consolidation of 
European peace." The restrictions Germany was asked to accept would 
"prove that the rule of international law had prevailed," and negotia-
tions would not be opened with Germany "until she has expressly accepted 
all the preliminary conditions, which form an indivisible whole." 
Greatly exaggerating the results of his efforts in London, Flandin was 
able to find "great improvement" in French security. 
38 Le Temps, March 20, 1936, p. 8; March 21, 1936, p. 2. 
39Flandin, Politique francaise, pp. 209-210. 
The four other signatory Powers have affinned on March 19 
that Locarno still exists. . . . Nothing has changed unless 
it is that, by reason of the Gennan repudiation, henceforth 
and until the treaty has been regularly abrogated, the guar-
antees which the treaties provided in favor of Gennany, 
France, and Belgium will apply to France and Belgium only. 
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While depreciating the danger inherent in the presence of Gennan troops 
in the Rhineland, he referred to the British military commitment as if 
it were absolutely certain. 
In so far as the entry of Gennan forces into the demilita-
rized zone created, if not a threat, at least the possibility 
of a future threat, it was important that the action of the 
guarantors could be taken rapidly and thus more efficacious-
ly. In full agreement with the Belgian delegation, the 
French delegation insisted upon drawing up at once agreements 
to ensure the application of the military guarantees, since 
in the absence of such agreements, there might be delay in 
furnishing the promised assistance when the occasion arose. 
Flandin was certainly premature in announcing that "the Government 
brings to you, after the days which have been weighed down with agony, 
the consolidation of peace. 1140 What he actually brought were proposals 
which might have resulted in the consolidation of peace if they were 
ever accepted. The value which he ascribed to the commitment from 
Britain was hardly definite, since the British had just demonstrated 
that they could fail to act in accordance with their assurances. 
Although Flandin's confidence was later shown to be ill-considered, 
there was not much criticism of the policy he had arranged for France. 
At the close of his address, three-forths of the Deputies gave him a 
standing ovation. There was no debate, but a short statement was pre-
sented in support of the government by Robert Schuman, the President of 
the Commission for Alsace-Lorraine and the Deputy from Thionville. 
40Pierre-Etienne Flandin, March 20, 1936, Debats, 1936, pp. 1063-
1065. 
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Speaking for those Frenchmen who were "under the fire of Geman can-
nons," he rejected all "political adventures" and "any hostility against 
Germany." 41 Then following the example of the Senate, the Chamber of 
Deputies voted 351 to 200 in favor of adjourning until June 1. 42 
Clearly, most members of Parliament did not want to damage their own 
prospects at the polls by criticizing the government and thus appear 
eager for war with Germany. 
Flandin's speech and his conduct of foreign affairs was reviewed 
favorably in most papers, but some had misgivings about the possibility 
of negotiating with Hitler. The ovation that Flandin received from the 
Chamber of Deputies was hailed in Le Petit Parisien as "a most touching 
testimonial for the gratitude of a nation." The readers of Le Matin 
were asked, "What better proof of the confidence of the Chamber could 
be given than their suspension of work at an hour as difficult in our 
history?" Georges Bidaul t, in L' Aube, doubted the success that had been 
claimed, although he admitted that Flandin had probably achieved all 
that could have been hoped. 
That which, after 'the days heavy with agony,' M. P.-E. 
Flandin brought back from London, is, finally, the restric-
tion of a Franco-British alliance. . . . But there was no 
other solution possible in the situation, other than accept-
ing France alone in the face of Germany--the duel or the 
duet. 
In Le ~' Leon Bailby predicted that French diplomacy would not cease 
retreating, since any new settlement would have the same germ for 
41on March 12, the Senators had cast 231 votes in favor of ratifying 
the Franco-Soviet Treaty with 52 abstentions. After the remilitariza-
tion of the Rhineland, many Senators who had been opposed to an alliance 
with Russia decided that it was best to give the appearance of unity. 
42 , Robert Schuman, March 20, 1936, Debats, 1936, p. 1065; Le Temrs, 
March 22, 1936, pp. 3,4. 
d . ·11 . 43 1s1 us1on. Although few journalists were optimistic about the 
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British guarantee, there was not much criticism of the policy the gov-
ernment had followed. Perhaps the French people had unconsciously given 
up any idea of protecting Eastern Europe when the Maginot Line was 
built--that is, if they ever really wanted anything other than a defen-
sive foreign policy. Now that France had, in theory, lost the ability 
to deliver a crushing blow against Germany in the Rhineland, there was 
not much public concern about Eastern Europe. In case such criticism 
came, the British and French governments were announcing at every oppor-
tunity that the proposals they had made did not neglect the security of 
the East. 
On March 24, the German government made its first official reply 
to the proposals which the Locarno powers had presented on March 19. 
Ribbentrop returned to London with a memorandum restating the opinion 
of the German government and rejecting the Locarno proposals on the 
grounds that they were "based on a new discrimination which is intoler-
able." Nevertheless, the German government was willing to comply with 
the British request and present new proposals after the elections. 44 
In the private conversations that followed the delivery of the note, 
Eden said that Ribbentrop reacted violently to the mention of Staff 
talks, and even had the "impudence" to say that he hoped the prospect 
of Staff talks would not be mentioned to Parliament. 45 According to 
the German interpreter, 
4311Revue de la presse," Le Temps, March 22, 1936, p. 4. 
44 London Times, March 25, 1936, p. 16. 
45Eden, Facing ~Dictators, p. 406. 
The phrase 'staff talks' to Ribbentrop at that time was like 
a red rag to a bull. He felt instinctively that concrete 
military agreements between England and France would be a 
very high price to pay for the militarization of the Rhine-
land. 46 
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Ignoring Ribbentrop's admonition, Eden devoted considerable time 
to responding to criticism of the Staff talks and the British guarantee 
when he spoke to the House of Commons on March 26. France and Belgium 
had the right to request that sanctions be invoked and that the severity 
of the sanctions be increased until the German troops were withdrawn 
from the Rhineland. Since such a request had been made at the beginning 
of the crisis and Eden was "not prepared to be the first British Foreign 
Secretary to go back on a British signature," the agreement reached by 
the Locarno powers had to be supported as compensation "for the loss of 
security suffered by France and Belgium." He maintained that Britain 
already had clear obligations under the Treaty of Locarno and that 
therefore "the only question that can be at issue is whether or not you 
are prepared to make arrangements to carry out those obligations should 
the need arise." The staff conversations were "only for the purpose of 
obligations under the Locarno Treaty," and there was a clear distinction 
between "staff conversations for a specific and limited purpose now and 
47 those conversations in the years before 1914." After Eden's speech 
several members of the Labour Party questioned the propriety of setting 
the greater criminal to catch the lesser one by stationing Italian 
troops in the Rhineland. In addition, there were those who feared that 
Britain was seeking peace in the West at the expense of the East. 
46schmidt, Hitler's Interpreter, p. 45. 
47Anthony Eden, March 26, 1936, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 
5th Series, vol. CCCX, col. 1439-1453. 
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However, the majority of the members of all parties were willing to ac-
cept the general principles which Eden had outlined, although some of 
the details were still open to question. 
The next move in what was becoming a chess game of proposals and 
counterproposals was left to the German people, who were prepared to do 
what Hitler expected of them. When they went to the polls on March 29, 
the majority could sincerely vote in favor of securing equal rights for 
Germany, but the method of the election made it difficult for them to 
do anything else. The only means of voting against the Nazi party re-
quired defacing the ballot and probably could not be kept secret. Nev-
ertheless, the importance of the 98.8 percent majority should not be 
denied, since Hitler was extremely concerned about being able to claim 
that his policy had been endorsed by the entire German nation. In 
evaluating the influence of the election, Francois-Poncet, the French , 
ambassador in Berlin, wrote that 
It is this gain of five million votes, being added to the 
thirty-nine million already assured, which will constitute 
in the eyes of the National-Socialists that which is unpre-
cedented, stupendous~ fantastic, and phenomenal in the bal-
loting of March 29.4~ 
The day after the German elections, in a speech made to his con-
stituency at Vezelay, Flandin posed several precise questions which he 
wanted the German government to answer clearly when it responded to the 
Locarno proposals. Two special questions were intended to challenge 
the sincerity of the German proposals of March 7. 
What will be the value of a treaty tomorrow if Germany can 
reserve for itself the right to repudiate it in the name of 
eternal morality and the vital rights of the German people? 
48Dispatch, Fran~ois-Poncet to Flandin, Berlin, March 29, 1936, 
.Q.Qf., 2nd Series, vol. I, Doc. No. 543, p. 718. 
What will be the value tomorrow of a new treaty with 
Germany, the only independent and impartial judge that she 
will recognize and to whose decisions she will submit? 
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France still intended to resist any German attempt to separate peace in 
the West from Eastern Europe or to divide the proposals made by the 
Locarno powers. 
For us, peace is indivisible, and it cannot be covered by 
bilateral pacts of nonaggression which one of the nations 
could repudiate at any chosen moment, while the others would 
be prevented from taking collective action, designed to con-
tribute to the respect of legal treaties and the security of 
all the associates, strong or weak, great or small. 
Calling attention to the fact that German propaganda was increasing in 
Austria, Danish Schleswig, Polish Silesia, Czechoslovakia, and Switzer-
land at the same time Hitler was making appeals for peace and saying he 
had no further territorial demands, Flandin questioned German motiva-
tion as compared to that of France. 
If Chancellor Hitler is prepared for a general discussion 
without reservation or reticence, then let him reply to all 
the questions which we have posed and then let him say so be-
fore his people, not by vague speeches designed to mislead or 
lull certain public opinion, but by a categorical and precise 
declaration, . • . We are all the more resolved to work to-
ward the establishment of a true and durable peace, accord-
ingly we are determined to denounce manoeuvres and trickery 
which, under the mask of peace, will prepare the way for new 
conflicts and new wars.49 
Deciding not to reply directly to Flandin's questions, the German 
government sent Ribbentrop to London on March 31 as promised. Having 
just received "a solemn general mandate to represent the Reich and the 
German nation," the German government was prepared to work for "a gen-
eral reconciliation and understanding of the nations of Europe" as long 
as its freedom, independence, and equality were preserved. The 
49 ~Temps, March 31, 1936, p. 1. 
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reoccupation of the Rhineland was defended not only on the familiar 
grounds that the Franco-Soviet Pact violated the Treaty of Locarno, but 
also because the demilitarization provisions of the Treaty of Versailles 
violated the trust that Germany had put in Wilson's Fourteen Points and 
"the only legal argument behind them was force." The German government 
rejected "all proposals in the draft [made by the Locarno powers on 
March 19] which impose one-sided burdens on Germany and therefore dis-
criminate against her." There were only a few changes in the policy 
Hitler had announced on March 7. Germany was willing to consider the 
twenty-five-year nonaggression pacts only for four months. During the 
four-month period of negotiations, an international commission which 
could observe military activities in the Rhineland was acceptable. If 
obligations which required military assistance should develop during 
the discussions for nonaggression pacts, Germany was also willing to 
asstune such obligations. 50 Previously, Hitler had refused to be com-
mitted to any arrangements for mutual assistance, and this point could 
be considered a kind of concession from Germany. 
On April 3, although Eden said that these new proposals were "most 
important and deserving of careful study," the German government had 
failed to make the contribution for which he had asked. Accordingly, 
he told the House of Commons that on April 1, he had sent a letter to 
the Belgian and French governments which stated that Britain was ready 
to "instruct their General Staffs forthwith to enter into contact." It 
was the view of the British government that the delivery of this letter 
in no way implied that their effort for conciliation had failed, and 
SOLondon Times, April 2, 1936, p. 9. 
llO 
Belgium and France were asked to confinn their understanding that "this 
contact between the General Staffs cannot give rise in respect of either 
Government to any political undertaking, nor to any obligation regarding 
the organization of national def~nce." Eden thought that announcing 
British readiness for Staff talks at this time was the only action that 
could give "the sense of security" which was required for the beginning 
f . . 51 o negotiations. 
In order to avoid the unfavorable publicity that could have come 
from a quick rejection, the French government chose to make a detailed 
reply to the Gennan memorandum and present new proposals to the Locarno 
Powers. The French ambassadors in London, Berlin, Rome, and Brussels 
were called to Paris on April 3 so that they could participate in draft-
ing the French proposals. Franrois-Poncet, the ambassador in Berlin, 
complained that this was the only meeting of the sort that he attended 
and criticized the French government for failing to use the knowledge 
gained by the ambassadors in an effective manner. When asked if the 
Gennan peace plan was truly sincere, Fran~ois-Poncet answered quite 
correctly that 
For the time being, [Hitler's] chief care was to feed the 
conversation, for, while it was going on, his troops remained 
in the Rhineland and the world was growing accustomed to 
their presence there. . . . When Hitler spoke of peace, it 
was Gennan peace, pax gennanica. 
In his detennination to shake off the consequences of the defeat of 
1918, and establish domination in Central Europe, he was "a pirate who 
observed neither the manners nor the morality of the regular navy." 
51Anthony Eden, April 3, 1936, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 
5th Series, vol. CCCX, col. 2303-2308. 
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Franrois-Poncet predicted that although Hitler probably did not want 
war, Germany would fight if Britain and France attempted to stand in 
h . 52 is way. 
On April 6, the French Council of Ministers approved a commentary 
and reply to the German memorandum which was sent to the British govern-
ment. After sending copies to the Italian and Belgian governments, the 
texts of both documents were released to the press on April 9. The new 
German contention that the demilitarization of the Rhineland was "coun.., 
ter to the engagements taken at the moment of Armistice" was dismissed 
as having "no foundation either directly or indirectly." According to 
the French, the Germans were attempting to invoke a new juridical 
theory "that no nation could voluntarily renounce its sovereign rights 
without exterior pressure." Thus, Germany, was claiming the right to 
question the "territorial statute results from the treaties of 1919 
in spite of whatever confirmations [there] may have been 
since the peace was made." As a contribution to peace, the German plan 
was "unfortunately more apparent than real." Considering the German 
propensity for the coup ~ theatre, each of their proposals was examined 
and rejected as insincere and incompatible with their actions. 
After the critical examination of the German thesis, the French 
government put forward its own peace proposals based on "collective 
security, mutual assistance, disarmament, economic cooperation, and 
European associations." Recognition that "the first basis of interna-
tional relations should be ••. the equality of rights and independence 
of all States" did not prevent any nation from "voluntarily and in the 
52Franrois-Poncet, The Faithful Years, p. 200. 
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common interest, limiting in certain circumstances the exercise of its 
sovereignty and rights." Although conceding that "no treaty should be 
regarded as unalterable," the French proposed that all nations accept 
the territorial status quo for twenty-five years. Then international 
boundaries could not be modified without the consent of all nations in-
volved in the change. For "the permanent control of the carrying-out 
of treaties," France proposed the establishment of a European Commission 
with its own military force under the League. 53 Certainly, there was 
nothing in these French proposals that had not been rejected by Germany 
several times or anything that was really specific enough to serve as a 
basis for negotiations in the immediate future. However, these propos-
als did serve the definite purpose of giving the appearance of still 
working for peace, and as Francois-Poncet observed, ''Things were being 
J 
done as though the lawyers of two parties to a suit were exchanging 
briefs before an imaginary jury. 1154 
At the April meeting of the League in Geneva, the Locarno powers 
held discussions to determine their procedure against Germany. They 
indicated in an official communique on April 10 that although Germany 
had not made any contribution, they were still interested in exploring 
all the possibilities for reconciliation. Therefore, the representative 
of Great Britain was instructed to inquire into the meaning of the bi-
lateral treaties proposed by Germany. The Locarno powers announced that 
their General Staff conversations would begin on April 15. The French 
peace plan would be submitted to the League, and Germany was also 
53Le Temps, April 9, 1936, p. 1. 
54Fran~ois-Poncet, The Faithful Years, p. 200. 
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invited to submit its plan. The Italian government was represented at 
this meeting, as it had been at the other Locarno discussions, but it 
d . 1 55 reserve its approva , 
On April 15, officers representing the armed forces of France, 
Belgium, and Britain met in London. The Italian government remained 
aloof and did not even send an observer. During the conference, which 
lasted only two days, details concerning troops, ports, communications, 
and transportation were exchanged. It was decided that after the War 
Ministries had studied the information, the results could be transmitted 
, 56 by their military attaches. Although their military collaboration 
was not extensive at this time, these talks certainly laid the founda-
tion for an alliance and caused many in Germany to think that the price 
for the remilitarization of the Rhineland might be too high. 
In France, the responsibility for allowing German troops to stay 
on the Rhine was not really an issue in the campaign that spring. Most 
Frenchmen were too concerned about their stagnant economy or the threat 
of a Bolshevik revolution to discuss seriously foreign policy and mili-
tary theory. French failure to do something about the German coup was 
not really associated with any particular party and indeed, was seldom 
called a failure. Hitler's judgment that most Frenchmen were too con-
cerned with domestic issues to recognize the seriousness of his activi-
ties was proved correct. There were the usual political statements 
about national defense and desire for peace, but the specific implica-
tions of the remilitarization of the Rhineland were not made a campaign 
55London Times, April 11, 1936, p. 12. 
56Eden, Facing the Dictators, pp. 417-418; London Times, April 15, 
1936, p. 10; April 20, 1936, p. 14. 
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issue. 
However, when Leon Blum was almost killed by a hooligan element of 
the Action Francaise, many were convinced that the threat of Fascism in 
J 
France was certainly real. This unprovoked attack was so outrageous 
that Action Francaise, ostensibly a royalist organization which general-
' 
ly followed any course that would damage democracy and the Republic, was 
dissolved by a decree from the Sarraut government. Charles Maurras, the 
leader of Action Francaise and the publisher of its newspaper, was ulti-
' 
mately indicted for incitement to murder through his inflammatory arti-
cles. The contention that only the Popular Front, a coalition of Radi-
cal Socialists, Socialists, and Communists, could save the country from 
Fascism was thus given considerable credence, although the promise of 
economic and social reform, which included higher pay, collective bar-
gaining, public works, and banking reform, probably attracted more 
57 
moderate votes. 
The opposition from Moderates and the Right was badly divided. 
Instead of aligning with sincere Republicans in support of the reform 
which France desperately needed, they vilified the Popular Front as a 
"dictatorship from Moscow'' and predicted bankruptcy, inflation, disarm-
ament, and war with Germany if Communists were elected. The internal 
violence which had followed the election of a Popular Front government 
in Spain was often mentioned as a portent for France. Le Temps, hoping 
to inspire a united opposition, asked, "What if the Popular Front, 
having succeeded in deceiving a majority of the voters in France, 
57Shirer, ~Collapse of~ Third Republic, pp, 287-288. 
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revolutionaries would introduce this country to fire and blood?1158 
Faced with what they were told was a choice between Communism and 
Fascism, the majority chose the Popular Front, not because they wanted 
Communism or Socialism, but because they wanted a change from the con-
servative policies that had failed to bring France out of the 
D . 59 epress1on. 
The results of the first election on April 26 were not conclusive, 
but they did favor the Popular Front. In those districts where one can-
didate did not receive an absolute majority in the first election, there 
would be a runoff the following Sunday. Alarmed by an increase of 697, 
348 votes over the number the Communists had won in 1932, ~Temps 
called for "the formation of a greaty party for counterrevolution" to 
protect France from the perils of Communism. 60 However, the superior 
discipline of the Popular Front parties was obvious in the second round 
of elections on May 3. In most instances, their candidates which had 
received the largest vote in the first election had the support of 
nearly all the voters on the Left, while the Right remained divided. 
The following table compares the membership of the Chamber of Deputies 
in 1932 to that of 1936: 61 
58~ Temps, April 19, 1936, p. 1. 
59Bonnefous, Histoire de.!.!:. troisieme republique, vol. V, pp. 406-
417. 
60Le Temps, April 29, 1936, p. 3. 
61Bonnefous, Histoire de.!.!:. troisieme republique, vol. V, pp. 419-
422. 
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1932 1936 Gain Loss 
Communists 10 72 62 
Dissident Communists 11 10 1 
Socialists 97 146 49 
Socialist Republican Union 45 26 19 
Independent Socialists 21 9 12 
Radical Socialists 158 115 43 
Total Popular Front 342 m 
Independent Radicals 65 31 34 
Left Republicans 99 83 16 
Popular Democrats 23 23 
Democratic Republican Union 76 88 12 
Conservatives 6 11 5 
Total Opposition '269 236 
The only members of the Sarraut government who were not reelected were 
~ 
Deat and Stern, the Ministers of Air and Colonies. If there was any 
implication for foreign policy in the election, it indicated support 
for disarmament, the League, and cooperation with the Soviet Union. 
While waiting for the Blum government to assume office, the British 
completed drafting the questionnaire they had agreed to present to 
Germany, On May 6, Sir Eric Phipps, the British ambassador in Berlin, 
was instructed to seek an interview with Hitler in order to "search out 
the ambiguities in the German memoranda." It was a week before Hitler 
would accept the questionnaire, and by that time the British government 
had decided to release the entire series of questions to the press, be-
cause most of it had already been leaked. The purpose of the British 
inquiries was to secure ''the greatest possible precision" on the points 
which required elucidation prior to beginning negotiations. In general, 
the British questions were concerned with the respect that Germany might 
now be expected to show for the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles 
which remained operative. 62 When the interview was finally granted to 
Phipps on May 14, Hitler said that he would delay making a specific 
62London Times, May 9, 1936, p. 14. 
117 
reply until the newly elected French government took office. In fact, 
he never felt obligated to reply. After the German elections, Hitler 
was certain that he could deal with Britain and France from a position 
of strength and therefore had no reason to hurry negotiations with them. 
Most of the interview was devoted to the customary tirade on equal 
rights and Bolshevism in Spain and France. Hitler's only response to 
the questionnaire was to claim that he had the right to alter the sec-
tions of the Treaty of Versailles which limited German sovereignty, but 
he recognized that the sections dealing with territorial clauses could 
63 
not be altered except by agreement. 
On June 4, the newly elected Popular Front government assumed 
office in Paris amid nationwide strikes which the lame duck Sarraut 
government could not stop. Involved with this domestic crisis which 
threatened to wreck Blum's government, the first foreign policy state-
ment was not given until June 23. The new government seemed imbued 
with a spirit of conciliation not usually shown by governments to the 
Right. The main theme was that France desired "peace for all peoples 
and with all peoples, knowing that it is indivisible and that none would 
be safe from the conflagration that would flare up if vigilance on the 
part of the pacific nations were not ever-present and ever-active." The 
French government pledged complete faith in the League and collective 
security, while relying on "the unreserved support of Great Britain, the 
cordial sympathy of the United States ... and the powerful cooperation 
of the U.S.S.R." Although the parties which formed the Popular Front 
had always been in favor of an understanding with Germany, they could 
63Eden, Facing~ Dictators, p. 420. 
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not ignore Germany's rearmament and repudiation of treaties. Neverthe-
less, they were prepared to examine any sincere German proposals that 
did not conflict with the principle of undivided peace. They also 
favored lifting the sanctions against Italy, which no longer served a 
64 
useful purpose. 
Briefly, it appeared that there might be closer cooperation among 
the Locarno powers. On July 3, the representatives of Britain, Belgium, 
and France to the League decided that a conference between their prime 
ministers and foreign ministers, as well as those of Italy, was needed 
to discuss the status of the Locarno Pact. 65 However, on July 11, Italy 
declined the invitation issued by the Belgian government on the grounds 
that "certain Mediterranean obligations . . . form an obstacle to 
Italy's participation." Moreover, the Italians thought that it would 
be necessary to invite Germany to any preparatory meeting. 66 
On July 23, the representatives of Britain, Belgium, and France met 
in London to discuss the international situation and to decide how they 
might get negotiations started with Italy and Germany. According to 
67 Eden, Belgium and France were "ready to make a reasonable agreement." 
This would seem to indicate that they were willing to forget about the 
interim period during which they had intended to require certain conces-
sions from Germany. The conference lasted only one day, and the com-
munique issued that evening was amazingly polite to Germany. Their 
64 Yvon Delbos, June 23, 1936 J oebats, 1936, pp. 1530-1546. 
65London Times, July 4, 1936, p. 14. 
66Ibid., July 14, 1936, p. 16. 
67 Facing the Dictators, 439. Eden, p. 
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expressed purposes were to arrange a meeting of the five original 
Locarno powers, to negotiate an agreement to take the place of the 
Locarno Pact, and to resolve "the situation created by the German ini-
tiative of the 7th March. 1168 There was no attempt to dictate a specific 
agenda for the meeting, nor was there any attempt to provoke answers or 
concessions from Germany. By referring to the German coup as merely a 
"situation" rather than a "flagrant breach," the conferees indicated 
their acceptance of German forces in the Rhineland. On July 31, the 
Italian and German governments announced that they accepted "in princi-
1 11 h • • • • • • f" • 69 p e t e invitation to participate in ive-power conversations. Nev-
ertheless, in spite of reminders sent by the British government on 
September 18, November 4, and November 19, the conference never materi-
alized, since other difficulties put ~t out of question. 
The beginning of the Spanish civil war in July had made negotia-
tions with Germany and Italy impossible. Although Blum's personal sym-
pathies were with the Popular Front government in Spain, he was not pre-
pared to face the storm of criticism that came after the news of his 
intention to send arms was leaked to the press. The Right in France was 
not opposed to seeing the insurgent members of the Spanish Army remove 
Socialists and Communists from power. At least, a Fascist government 
in Spain would not present the specter of a Red Revolution. Submitting 
to the pressure for nonintervention, Blum allowed only a few arms to 
enter Spain through unofficial channels. The result was the prolonga-
tion of the war without really giving enough assistance to make any 
68London Times, July 24, 1936, p. 14. 
69 Ibid., August 1, 1936, p. 12. 
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difference in the outcome. If France had acted quickly, perhaps the 
duly elected Popular Front government in Spain could have quelled the 
rebellion before German and Italian aid arrived. The establishment of 
another Fascist government on France's border was a severe moral blow 
to the prestige and integrity of the Left in France and certainly not 
. th . t f . 1 "t 70 in e in erest o nationa securi y. 
The protection of France's borders was further weakened in the fall 
of 1936 when the Belgian government asked to be released from the Treaty 
of Locarno. In 1919, Belgium had relinquished its traditional status of 
neutrality so that it could be closely associated with France. Since 
the Treaty of Versailles and the Franco-Belgian Military Agreement in 
1920, Belgium was generally regarded as a political satellite of France. 
However, during 1935 and 1936, the Belgians had witnessed the inability 
of France and Britain to make collective security effective. Moreover, 
the question of the French alliance had become involved with political 
pressure from the Flemish population, who had traditionally mistrusted 
the French. The conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact and the related 
danger of aggression from Germany caused the Belgian government to look 
more critically at being closely associated with French foreign poli-
71 
cy. On March 6, the day before the remilitarization of the Rhineland, 
France and Belgium had exchanged notes which recognized that parts of 
their 1920 agreement were outdated and that they would only maintain the 
provision for contact between their General Staffs. 72 On March 11, Van 
70shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic, pp. 296-306. 
71~, 1936, pp. 220-223. 
72 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
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Zeeland announced that the object of Staff conversations was to facili-
tate meeting obligations from the Treaty of Locarno and that a stipula-
tion had been added to assure that conversations would not "lead to any 
undertaking of a political nature nor any obligation with regard to the 
organization of national defence for either of the interested par-
t . II 73 ies. Thus, the friendship between Belgium and France was already 
questioned before the events of March 7 provided ample proof that guar-
antees from Britain and France would not automatically insure Belgian 
security. 
The Belgian government gradually adopted the belief that it would 
be safer to assume complete responsibility for its own defense and 
thereby avoid provoking Germany further. The first public warning of 
the change came on July 20, when Paul Spaak, the Foreign Minister in 
the new Cabinet organized by Van Zeeland in June, indicated that he in-
tended to follow a realistic policy. 
The nations of a continent cannot reasonably be asked to con-
sider with the same realism and sincerity of judgment affairs 
which directly concern them and events which are taking place 
thousands of kilometres away in regions where they have nei-
ther interests nor influence. Indivisible peace, mutual as-
sistance, and even collective security are general ideas 
whose practical effect must be clearly explained and clearly 
limited. 74 
The circumstances which caused the reexamination of Belgian foreign 
policy were reviewed by King Leopold III in an address to the Cabinet 
on October 14. Their aim had to be not that of "preparing for a more 
or less victorious war·as the result of an alliance, but at keeping war 
away from our territory." The remilitarization of the Rhineland had 
73SIA, ~' p. 353. 
74London Times, July 22, 1936, p. 15. 
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placed Belgium in a position similar to that before World War I, and 
because of geography, they were obligated to maintain "a military ma-
chine of such a size as to dissuade any of our neighbours whatsoever 
from using our territory for attacking another state." In meeting this 
obligation, Belgium was making such a contribution to the peace of West-
ern Europe that it created "a right to the respect, and to assistance 
if need be, of all the states which are interested in this peace." Pub-
lic opinion would not allow the government to go beyond a defense system 
capable of resisting attack; "All unilateral policy weakens our position 
abroad and--rightly or wrongly--arrouses dissensions at home," Assist-
ance from an ally could not arrive in time to prevent an invasion. Even 
though intervention might result in a final victory, "the struggle would 
have covered the country with ravages of which those of the 1914-18 war 
offer only a pale reflection." The primary purpose of the King's speech 
was to obtain support for the military preparations which were required 
for "a policy exclusively and completely Belgian. 1175 Since the speech 
was drafted specifically for its impact on domestic politics, and the 
King was persuaded to allow publication only after he was convinced that 
it would help in obtaining support for defense spending, the language 
and the force of the presentation was considerably different from what 
would have normally been made public. 
After the Belgian government realized that the speech had created 
an unfavorable impression in Paris and London, its ambassadors were in-
structed to convey assurances that Belgium had no intention of failing 
75rbid., October 15, 1936, p. 13. 
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76 to meet its obligations as a member of the League. Speaking to a 
meeting of the Brussels Socialist Federation on October 18, Spaak de-
clared that Belgium intended to remain with the League and participate 
in collective security, but he remembered the fate that had befallen 
Ethiopia because of its excessive reliance on collective security while 
neglecting its own defense. He added that Britain and France had dif-
ferent responsibilities in world politics and must for reasons of pres-
tige follow policies of their own, 77 It was clear that Belgium wanted 
protection and security without the commitment for reciprocal military 
assistance to France and Britain, By defending their own frontier, the 
Belgians hoped that France and Germany would recognize that both nations 
were thus protected from attack. Statements given by members of the 
Belgian government continued to stress the benefits for Britain and 
France in Belgian self-reliance. Speaking at a luncheon in London on 
November 27, Van Zeeland summarized the role that he saw for Belgium in 
European affairs, 
Our geographical position makes our country a keystone of 
Western Europe; one cannot tamper with keystones without 
wrecking the edifice itself. It is for us a duty--a duty 
towards ourselves and a duty to the great nations that are 
our neighbours--to do the utmost in our power to dissuade any 
one from the temptation of attacking us, of using our soil as 
a short cut. It is in this way that we, too, serve peace, 
not in word, but in deed ... ,78 
After a series of secret conversations culminating in a joint 
Anglo-French declaration on April 24, 1937, Belgium was released from 
its obligations under the Treaty of Locarno and the proposals of the 
76 Ibid., October 20, 1936, p. 15, 
77 Ibid., October 19, 1936, p. 13. 
78DIA __ , 1936, p. 234. 
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Locarno powers made in 1936. The communication issued by the British 
and French governments indicated that they were acting in response to 
the desire of Belgium to have its international rights and obligations 
clarified. Belgian determination to def~nd its borders against invasion 
and to prevent its territory from being used for aggression against 
another nation was noted. Britain and France reaffirmed their support 
of each other and maintained that they would assist Belgium under the 
terms of the Treaty of Locarno and the proposals of March 19, 1936. 
Belgium was released from the reciprocal guarantees for military assist-
B . . d F 79 ance to rita1n an ranee. When the declaration of April 24 was pre-
sented to the League on May 27, the representatives of Britain, France, 
and Belgium indicated that their governments believed that the declara-
tion should be regarded as a step towards the elaboration of a new 
Western Pact. 80 
However, nothing came from the expressed intentions to secure a 
replacement for the Treaty of Locarno. The promise that Britain had 
made on March 19 to consult with France if the new treaty with Germany 
failed was, according to Flandin, simply forgotten by succeeding govern-
ments. He was certain that when the Germans started fortifications in 
the Rhineland a new situation which required some further commitment 
from Britain was created, but France failed to make the effort to sal-
81 
vage even this last scrap from the ruins of Locarno. 
The tragic consequences of France's failure to prevent the 
79 London Times, April 26, 1937, p. 14. 
801bid., May 28, 1937, p. 15. 
81Flandin, Politique francaise, p. 210. 
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remilitarization of the Rhineland were unequivocal. The defection of 
Belgium symbolized a decline of confidence in collective security and 
French military and diplomatic leadership. "With cruel anguish," Blum 
sensed "that here was a new symptom of the progressive dismantling of 
11 E . . 1182 a our uropean positions. Belatedly, the French made the decision 
to extend the Maginot Line to the sea along their border with Belgium, 
but only a skeletal framework was completed by the beginning of World 
War II. Although both the Belgian and French governments had affirmed 
their interest in continuing General Staff conversations between the 
two countries, very little of actual military value was ever accom-
plished. Although Gamelin had insisted that French troops had to be in 
place before the actual German invasion, the French were not invited to 
enter Belgium until the Germans had attacked in May, 1940, more than 
83 
eight months after the war had begun. Thus, France was left without 
the completion of the Maginot Line and without adequate concerted plans 
between the French and Belgian General Staffs. 
The progressive dismantling of French alliances continued in East-
em Europe. Efforts to strengthen French ties with the Little Entente, 
an alliance which France had sponsored between Czechoslovakia, Yugo-
slavia, and Romania since 1920, were unsuccessful. Although Blum ap-
proved a loan to finance Polish rearmament, the French government could 
not alter substantially the pro-German policy that Poland had initiated 
in 1934. 84 Since the French army had failed to act when the Rhineland 
82Quoted in Colton, Leon~' p. 207. 
83Gamelin, Servir, vol. II, p. 229. 
84shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic, p. 313. 
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was undefended, it was only reasonable for the nations to the east of 
Germany to assume that France was not likely to attack in their defense 
when fortifications were in place in the Rhineland. Therefore, they 
were forced to follow policies which would not provoke Hitler. 
The entire French system of collective security in Europe was pre-
dicated on the ability of the French army to deliver a crushing blow 
against the industrial heart of the Rhineland. Without this immediate 
threat, protecting Central Europe from German aggression became exceed-
ingly difficult, if not beyond the imagination of the French military, 
whose thinking and defensive nature simply did not correspond to 
France's foreign policy requirements. Certainly, they recognized that 
the remilitarization of the Rhineland would render all their planning 
useless, yet they never demanded that any action be taken to prevent 
the catastrophe and were content to engage in further studies while they 
knew the Germans were preparing to act. As long as Gamelin was in com-
mand, this process of postponing decisions by engaging in endless stud-
ies continued to plague the army. The remilitarization of the Rhineland 
might not have been such a tragedy if the French government could have 
learned that the army had to be prodded into preparing for offensive 
action, but the army was allowed to continue undisturbed in its obses-
sion with the defensive. Although Sarraut, Flandin, and Paul-Boncour 
recognized this flaw in the military, they did not make the essential 
changes. After the war, when Sarraut testified before the Parliamentary 
Investigating Committee, he freely admitted the mistake. 
One of the grave faults of politicians and members of govern-
ment is that they have always had complete confidence, perme-
ated by timidity, in the military .• , . It is stupid, but 
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h I h • • 85 t at s t e way it is. 
French foreign policy had little relation to military policy; in the 
case of the Rhineland crisis, it was the military which prevailed. 
Simple lack of foresight and preparation must be added to the over-
sight of the army. A small professional force that could penetrate the 
Rhineland quickly was needed, not mobilization for total war. The 
forces that were on active duty in France were more than adequate to 
drive out the few nervous Germans who were parading around in the Rhine-
land. Yet for reasons not made clear in the evidence now available, 
military intelligence completely misjudged the strength of the Germans 
and therefore misrepresented the reply that was required. The army, as 
well as the government, made a serious error in waiting for British 
approval and support. Gamelin insisted that the French army was pre-
pared for war, but he always added that it would be necessary to have 
the support of the other Locarno powers. 
Aside from their weakness in dealing with the army, the worst fault 
of the members of the government was wasting time with Britain and the 
League. The situation called for immediate action by France alone. 
Certainly, the British were hesitant, perhaps even hostile, to military 
action against Germany, but the attitude of Britain can only be an ex-
planation, not an excuse for the failure of the French government. Con-
sidering the ineptitude of the League in dealing with Hitler, it was 
totally naive to think that a mere condemnation would have any effect 
on the status of German troops in the Rhineland. 
Parliament, the press, and the public must be listed as 
85Quoted in ibid., p. 283. 
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contributors to French weakness and complacency. The national defense 
committees for the various branches of the armed forces should have in-
sisted that France have the army which its policies demanded, yet none 
of these committees seriously questioned the government or held investi-
gations to determine why German troops were allowed to remain unchal-
lenged in the Rhineland. When they met after March 7, it was only to 
receive reports on the measures that had been taken; in each instance, 
the statement read by the Chief of Staff was approved. The inappropri-
ate leadership of the army is not surprising, since it was never cross-
examined by those who were elected and legally responsible for national 
security. It is sufficient to say that the press failed to meet its 
responsibility to inform a free society. French journalism in many in-
stances had become merely partisan propaganda. Investigation and cri-
tical reporting was often replaced by not very subtle political adver-
tising. On both the Left and Right the press was prepared time after 
time to see national security sacrificed to domestic political ambi-
tions. Finally, French voters must bear some responsibility for the 
government they elected and the lack of concern shown for the vitality 
of basic democratic institutions. 
The ease with which the remilitarization of the Rhineland was ac-
complished had serious implications for the behavior that could be ex-
pected from Hitler. His staggering success at the polls proved that he 
had the public support which no leader of the Weimar Republic could 
have matched. The unfounded hesitancy and caution of the generals had 
demonstrated the superiority of the Fiihrer's intuition. Europe had no 
choice but to assume a different attitude toward Germany. Hitler, as 
usual, was suitably impressed by his own master stroke, and the coup 
129 
always remained one of his proudest accomplishments. 
Pursuing the new opportunities presented by the remilitarization 
of the Rhineland, Hitler signed three treaties in rapid succession and 
embarked on a new foreign adventure. On July 11, Austria signed an 
agreement with Germany which required that its foreign policy always 
recognize that it was a "German state." On July 22, Hitler decided to 
support the rebellion in Spain in order to prolong the conflict to such 
an extent that Italy could never come to terms with Britain and France. 
In August, Ribbentrop was sent to London in an unsuccessful effort to 
reach an agreement with Britain. The piece de resistance for Hitler 
was the formation of the alliances which united the nations that would 
be the aggressors in World War II. On October 21, a secret protocol 
which outlined a common foreign policy for Germany and Italy was signed 
in Berlin, and on November 25, Germany and Japan signed the Anti-
Commintern Pact, which held the promise of defending Western civiliza-
tion from Communism. The propaganda value of the new alliance was ob-
vious, but in addition there was a secret protocol in which Germany and 
Japan agreed to "safeguard their common interests" in case of an attack 
b h S . u . 86 y t e oviet nion. 
In retrospect, it is obvious that France, by expelling the German 
troops from the Rhineland, could have deflected the rise of an aggres-
sive Germany and spoiled the blueprint which Hitler perfected for sub-
sequent offenses. The failure of the French government and military is 
made doubly tragic by the fact that they were painfully aware of the 
consequences for European peace and France. 
86William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A 
History of ~ Germany (New York,'196~pp. 407-411. 
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